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Professor Richard D. Pomp1
Executive Summary
This Report analyzes a 5% payroll tax that would be imposed on
employers on the amount of the wages they paid to their employees.
The anticipated response is that employers would shift this tax to their
employees. This shift would occur by the employers reducing their
employee wages by the cost of the tax. Each of the existing rates in the
personal income tax would be reduced by 5 points, which would have
the effect of eliminating the 3% and 5% brackets.. This reduction in
rates would be limited to wages and not apply to other items of
income, such as dividends, interest, capital gains, rents, royalties and
the like.
This reduction in rates should apply only if wages were reduced.
Otherwise, employees would receive a windfall in having a tax
reduction for no reason, and State revenue would be needlessly lost.
Moreover, if employees were to receive the benefit of the tax
reduction, little incentive would exist for them to support a reduction in
their wages. A “tie-in” should be required; that is, the rate reduction
should apply only if wages were reduced.
The dilemma with a tie-in is that it might be difficult to determine
whether wages have been reduced or not, and to what extent. Many
ways exist for an employer to reduce wages and some of these may not
be transparent. And while the payroll tax assumes its cost will be

A curriculum vitae and short summary of my background are found at the end of
the Report. Sebastian Iagrossi, a third-year student at UConn Law School, and the
2019 winner of the Stanley R. Arnold Scholarship, awarded by the New England
State and Local Tax Forum, provided invaluable research for this Report.
1
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shifted to employees, it might be shifted backward to suppliers and
independent contractors, or forward to customers.
A tie-in imposes another administrative complexity because there
would be one rate schedule for those whose wages were reduced and
another for those whose wages were not. But the advantages of a tie-in
are considerable and merit a detailed exploration.
If the view is that employers are typically able to reduce their costs, and
thus will be able to shift the payroll tax to employees, an explicit tie-in
would be unnecessary. If the payroll tax is shifted to employees by
reducing their wages, three consequences follow. First, an employee’s
federal income taxes would be reduced because of the lowered wages.
Second, reduced wages mean an employee would pay lower FICA taxes
(Social Security and Medicare). Third, the employer would also pay less
FICA taxes.
Assuming wages would be reduced, then for most taxpayers the
Connecticut and federal tax savings would more than offset the
reduction in wages. Somewhat counter intuitively, these employees
would have more take-home pay despite their wages being reduced.
Less turns out to be more, at least in the short-term. But lower wages
and hence lower FICA taxes will likely mean lower retirement income or
lower Social Security benefits for many workers unless employers take
actions to offset that reduction. Employers could use their FICA savings
to subsidize this offset. In addition, disciplined employees could also
invest their new tax savings for retirement.
For low-income taxpayers, the reduction in their wages would be more
than their tax savings. One way of addressing this problem is through a
refundable tax credit. Refundable tax credits, however, raise the
possibility of fraudulent returns.
5

Under the law, employers would not be able to reduce the wages of
minimum wage employees. Consequently, one way of dealing with this
issue is to exempt the wages paid to these employees from the payroll
tax.
Suppose contrary to the assumption above, wages could not be
reduced. Then the payroll tax would become an explicit tax on
employers and not an implicit tax on employees. These employers
would be saddled with a new 5% cost of doing business. They would
receive no reduction in their FICA taxes. Unless there were a tie-in,
their employees would nonetheless receive the benefit of the rate
reduction. Under this scenario of no wage reduction, the tax would be
shifted from employees to employers.
If the Legislature desires this shift in taxation, easier ways of achieving
it exist, rather than in the guise of an ineffective payroll tax.
A critical threshold question, therefore, is whether employers will be
able to shift the payroll tax to employees by reducing their wages. If
they cannot, there is no reason to adopt a payroll tax. Answering this
critical question would be avoided if the payroll tax were elective,
rather than mandatory. Then only employers confident that they could
reduce wages would opt into the payroll tax; the others would simply
not make the election. A tie-in would prevent employees of employers
that did not opt in from receiving a windfall.
New York has made its new payroll tax elective, and phases in its rates
over three years. To date, only 0.1% of its employers have elected the
tax. But New York’s payroll tax is dissimilar to the Connecticut proposal.
And the participation rate may be a function of how the payroll tax was
explained and promoted. The New York experience needs further
analysis.
6

Nonprofits like hospitals, schools, the State, local governments and the
like pay FICA taxes. If they can reduce their employee wages they will
benefit from the lowered FICA taxes.
The State is in a different position from all other employers, whether
they are non-profits or not. The State would be both the taxpayer and
the recipient of the tax. It would not have to shift the tax to its
employees because the tax is not a cost—the tax is a wash. Yet if its
employees received the benefits of the rate reduction without any
reduction in their wages, they could be perceived as getting a raise. The
issue is whether the State should somehow recapture some or all of
those benefits. This problem would be avoided if there were a tie-in.
A payroll tax cannot be imposed on the federal government without its
permission, which is unlikely to be forthcoming. Similarly, a payroll tax
cannot be imposed on an Indian tribe in its capacity as an employer on
a reservation. Without a tie-in, the federal and tribal employees would
be able to benefit from the state income tax rate reduction even
though their wages had not been reduced. A tie-in would prevent this.
Insurance companies are subject to retaliatory taxes, which are unique
to that industry. It is uncertain whether the payroll tax will trigger
retaliation. If retaliation results, Connecticut insurance companies will
face increased costs in doing business in other states and be at a
competitive disadvantage.
Implementing a payroll tax represents a major change to Connecticut’s
tax code, and the lack of a fully drafted bill hobbled what could be said
in this Report with any certainty. There are many moving parts, many of
which are interdependent. This Report identifies many of the questions
needing answers. The Commission has a formidable challenge before it.

7

I.

My Assignment

I have been asked by the Office of Policy and Management to prepare a
report covering the following areas:
a.
Provide a high-level summary of who would benefit from a state
payroll tax versus a state income tax for both itemizers and nonitemizers at the federal level.
b. Outline the major tenets of any other similar tax programs across
the country.
2.

Internal Revenue Service2

a.
In crafting a payroll tax, what pitfalls do you foresee under which
the Internal Revenue Service would prohibit a state payroll tax?
b. If a payroll tax were instituted and later prohibited by the Internal
Revenue Service, who would bear the enforcement consequences
under such a scenario and what remedies would taxpayers or the state
have?
3.

Federal Government/Tribal Nations

The payroll tax may be the subject of future litigation between the federal
government and Connecticut. My analysis of these issues in this Report would not
be covered by any attorney-client privilege. Should there be litigation, discovery
requests would likely extend to my work papers, drafts, and communications in
preparing this Report. It is prudent that the State speaks with one voice in any
potential litigation involving the characterization of the payroll tax. Consequently,
my legal analysis of that issue should be deferred and take place in a manner
where the attorney-client privilege applies. My caution should not be interpreted
as my having reached a position or having even considered the merits of the
questions posed—I have not.
2
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a.
Provide an opinion on the ability of the state to impose a payroll
tax on the federal government and tribal nations.
b. What legal arguments could the federal government or tribal
nations make to avoid being subject to the tax?
4.

Credit to Other Jurisdictions

a.
Outline the tax consequences under the proposed payroll tax for
individuals who work in other states yet reside in Connecticut.
b. Outline the tax consequences under the proposed payroll tax for
individuals who work in Connecticut yet reside in other states.
5.

Insurance Companies

a.
Would the imposition of a state payroll tax on insurance
companies impact the retaliatory tax?
6. Other legal/policy issues that arise in the course of the
Commission’s deliberations
While my Report responds to the issues posed,3 it does so in a different
order.
II. Overview
The Legislature created a Payroll Commission (Commission)4 to study
the viability of a payroll tax. Hopefully, this Report provides useful
background information and analysis to help the Commission identify
fundamental policy and design issues that need resolution. The
Conclusion to the Report sets forth these issues in a systematic fashion.

3
4

The one exception has been explained above. See id.
Public Act 19-117; Section 385.
9

One of the threshold questions for the Commission is whether it would
be more cautious to make the tax elective, at least in the short-term,
which is what New York did. In April 2018, New York adopted an
elective payroll tax, known as the Employer Compensation Expense
Program (ECEP).5
The ECEP is phased-in over a three-year period. The rates increase from
1.5% of employee wages in 2019 to 5% in fiscal year 2021. New York
estimates around 312 employers, approximately 0.1% of employers,6
will have opted into the program by December 2019.7 Anecdotally, it is
believed these are primarily small partnerships. Currently, none of the
major employers, including New York State, has opted in.
This Report labors under two major constraints. First, no fully fleshed
out bill has been approved by the General Assembly’s Finance, Revenue
and Bonding Committee, nor has either chamber of the General
Assembly passed a bill. There is a bill, S. B. 1143,8 proposing a 5%
payroll tax, but it was drafted as a “placeholder,” with many details
missing.
Implementing a payroll tax represents a major change to Connecticut’s
tax code, and the lack of a fully drafted bill hobbles what can be said
with any certainty. There are simply too many moving parts, many of
which are interdependent. Many questions need to be answered and
refined in order to adopt a fully functioning statute—or at least one
Intentionally or not, New York was right in eliminating the term “payroll tax”
from the name of its legislation. More about this in the Conclusion.
6 https://www.wsj.com/articles/few-n-y-businesses-sign-up-for-state-program-tobypass-trump-tax-limits-1543766400.
7
James Nani, NY's Payroll Tax Workaround Effort Draws 50 More Businesses, Law
360, December 10, 2019.
8
S.B. 1143, An Act Establishing a Payroll Tax. This bill seems loosely modeled after
New York’s Employer Compensation Expense Program (ECEP).
5
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that provides enough guidance to the Department of Revenue Services
(“DRS”) for the drafting of regulations and other forms of guidance to
taxpayers. The Commission confronts a formidable challenge.
Second, a tax modeling consultant (“Consultant”) who can work with
large data and who would have access to DRS data is necessary to
provide critical quantitative analysis of a payroll tax under various
assumptions and simulations. The data would be decisive in moving
forward with the Commission’s deliberations but was not available at
the time of this Report.9
In preparing this Report, I have talked off the record with numerous
experienced and sophisticated persons, in both the private and public
sectors. The opinions below are obviously mine alone.
III. The Concept of a Payroll Tax
A. Policy Rationale
The proposal10 calls for the imposition of a 5% payroll tax on wages paid
by an employer to its employees for services provided in Connecticut
The Connecticut School Finance Project (“Project”) has done remarkable
simulations of a payroll tax, but has been limited by working with only publicly
available data. The Project deserves much credit for identifying the areas that
require more rarified and stratified data of the type to which the Consultant
would have access.
As of December 2019, the Connecticut School Finance Project changed its
name to The School and State Finance Project.
In the interest of disclosure, the very able Director of the Project, Katie Roy,
won the Morris Pomp Award at UConn Law School. I established this in memory
of my father, and it is awarded to the graduate with the highest grade in his or
her tax courses.
10
“Proposal” refers to Senate Bill 1143 as interpreted by the DRS and the Office of
Policy and Management.
9
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(Connecticut wages).11 In exchange for this tax on the employer, the
existing rates in the Connecticut personal income tax rate would each
be reduced by 5 points.12 If that were all there was to the proposal, it
would be nothing more than a proposal to shift the tax burden from
individuals with Connecticut wages to their employers. If that were
really the goal, there are simpler ways of achieving it. But it is
reasonable to assume that few in the Legislature would endorse a tax
on Connecticut wages, which might discourage employment in the
State, even if the resulting revenue would be used to finance a
reduction in the personal income tax on Connecticut wages.
Instead, the anticipated response is that employers would shift the
burden of the 5% payroll tax to their employees by reducing their
Connecticut wages by the cost of the tax.13 Why would employees
accept a reduction in their Connecticut wages? For reasons that will be
A payroll tax might reinforce the current incentive for an employer to
characterize service providers as independent contractors rather than employees.
Employers have this incentive because of the savings that accrue from not having
to include independent contractors in their pension plans and health insurance
plans. Employers also do not have to pay FICA taxes for independent contractors.
(For an explanation of FICA taxes, see infra Section III.I). The characterization of
service providers has become especially relevant in the gig economy and
California has recently adopted legislation governing the issue. See California
Assembly Bill 5 (AB5). Proper worker classification is an active audit issue in
Connecticut.
A payroll tax also reinforces the current incentive to pay workers “off the
books.” The refundable low-income credit, see Section III.M, might encourage
some workers to surface and be paid on the books.
Whether a payroll tax would greatly aggravate either of these two preexisting problems is an unknown empirical question.
12
Under one proposal, some of rates would be reduced by less than 5 points.
13
The “cost” of the 5% payroll tax is not identical to 5%, but something less. See
infra note 44.
11
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explained below,14 employees would be better off, at least in the shortterm, with lowered wages and a rate reduction. This trade off would
lead to higher take-home pay. That higher take-home pay results from
reduced federal income taxes and reduced FICA taxes. Longer term
effects may be more problematic for certain employees.15
The rub is that employees would be better off with reduced wages only
if they would not otherwise receive the benefits of the state income tax
rate reductions. Put differently, the reduction in wages is the price paid
for receiving the offsetting benefits of reducing rates.
B. Who Should Benefit from Reducing Rates?
One policy decision is whether the state income tax reduction should
be eliminated across the board for all wages, regardless of whether the
wages were reduced. The correct policy answer would seem to be to
limit the benefit of a rate reduction only to employees whose wages
were reduced because the employer shifted the payroll tax to them.
Without this requirement of a tie-in, employees could be viewed as
receiving a windfall: a reduction in their Connecticut personal income
taxes without their wages being reduced.
The challenge for the Commission is how to limit the benefits of a tax
reduction to only wages that were reduced. In other words, how do we
assure that the benefits of a reduction in the rates are tied-in to a
reduction in wages?
One difficulty is that many ways exist for an employer to reduce wages
and some of these may not be transparent. A tie-in approach could be
difficult to administer without some evidence from the employer or
14
15

See infra Sections III.G, H.
See infra Section V.3.
13

employees that wages were indeed reduced in one form or another.
And could the DRS verify that evidence? Despite the administrative
challenges, a tie-in eliminates many problems, some of which are
discussed below, so it is worth considerable further analysis of this
issue in collaboration with the DRS.16
On the other hand, suppose the assumption is that employers are very
able to reduce their costs in general—and will do so specifically in the
case of the payroll tax. Under this assumption, wages will be reduced
and thus there is no need for a tie-in.
Certainly, the assumption that all wages subject to the payroll tax will
be reduced simplifies the analysis because it means that the payroll tax
is working as intended. If that assumption is challenged, however, and a
tie-in proves unworkable, the next possible approach would be to
extend the benefits of the tax reduction to all Connecticut wages that
were subject to the payroll tax, whether they were reduced or not. This
would require the employer to report an employee’s Connecticut
wages and non-Connecticut wages to the DRS; the former would
benefit from the tax reduction, the latter would not. If that proves to be
too administratively onerous in the case of a multistate corporation,
the benefits from income tax reduction could be extended to all wages,
and not limited to only Connecticut wages.
The latter approach eliminates a possible constitutional attack. If nonConnecticut wages are treated more harshly than Connecticut wages by
not receiving the benefits of a rate reduction, and there is no
acceptable reason for doing that other than administrative

16

See especially Section V.2.
14

convenience, a taxpayer could raise a constitutional argument that
interstate commerce was being discriminated against.17
A tie-in would help blunt this constitutional argument without the need
to grant the benefits of a tax reduction to all Connecticut wages. With a
tie-in, non-Connecticut wages would not be discriminated against
based on their geographical status but rather because they were not
reduced. This is one of the many cases in which a tie-in can play a
significant role.
If no tie-in exists, and if little revenue loss results between extending
the rate reduction to all wages and extending it for only Connecticut
wages, the more cautious approach would be to extend the benefits of
a rate reduction to all wages.18 On the other hand, if extending these
benefits to all wages meant a substantial revenue loss, the
constitutional issue will need to be analyzed in depth.
C. No Rate Reduction should be Extended to Non-Wage Income
Unjustified by the logic of the payroll tax would be reducing the rate of
tax on non-wages such as dividends, capital gains, interest, rent and the
like. These items of income would not trigger the 5% payroll tax. These
items could not be reduced by the employer, which would not have any
control over them. Different ways exist for limiting the benefits of a
rate reduction to only wages, and the DRS should be consulted to
determine what is most feasible from its perspective.
The Consultant could determine the revenue loss at stake between extending
the elimination of the 5% rate to all wages and limiting it to just Connecticut
wages.
18
These wages would include services performed outside Connecticut. Those
wages might not be subject to the payroll tax. See infra note 21 and
accompanying text.
17
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In determining the proper rate at which these non-wage items would
be taxed, an individual’s total income should be considered. In other
words, the rate should reflect an individual’s ability to pay, measured
by her total income. For example, someone with high wages should be
taxed on her non-wage income at a higher rate than someone with low
wages.
Connecticut uses this approach in determining the income tax payable
by nonresidents. Although nonresidents are taxed on only income
attributable to Connecticut, the rate at which that income is taxed is
determined by their entire income, including income attributable to
other states. This same sort of approach should be used in taxing nonwage income.
D. Should the Base of the Payroll Tax be Tied to the Existing
Withholding Tax on Wages?
Imposing the 5% rate on all wages rather than on just Connecticut
wages would have an administrative advantage of tying the base of the
payroll tax to the existing withholding tax on wages.19 That is, an easy
administrative rule would be that any wages on which the employer
already withholds the Connecticut personal income tax would be
subject to the 5% payroll tax.
Current law provides that anyone who maintains an office or transacts
business in Connecticut and is considered an employer for federal
withholding purposes must withhold the Connecticut income tax
whether or not the payroll department is located in Connecticut. In
general, all amounts that are wages and subject to federal withholding
Although commonly referred to as the “withholding tax,” withholding is not a
tax but rather a means of collecting a tax already owed by the recipient of the
income that is being withheld upon.
19
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are also wages for Connecticut income tax withholding purposes. These
amounts include, but are not limited to, fringe benefits, supplemental
compensation, golden parachutes, sick pay, moving expenses,
restricted stock income, stock options, non-compete income, deferred
compensation, and severance pay.20
In the case of residents, withholding applies to all their wages, even if
the resident works outside of Connecticut. Because withholding already
exists in this situation, it is tempting to include wages for services
performed outside Connecticut in the base of the payroll tax, especially
if that would generate significant revenue. Administratively, that might
seem attractive in the case of a Connecticut-based corporation with
employees performing services in and outside the State.
Administratively attractive or not, extending the reach of the payroll tax
to out-of-state wages would be constitutionally suspect.21
Unfortunately, if the tax were applied to only Connecticut wages, the

Public Act 18-49, Sec. 20(2)(C) provides that for purposes of determining the
compensation derived from or connected with sources within Connecticut,
nonresident individuals shall include income from days worked outside
Connecticut for their personal convenience and not for that of their Connecticut
employer, if their state of domicile uses a similar test. Delaware, Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, and most importantly New York, use a similar “convenience of the
employer” test.
21 Under the Commerce Clause, taxes have to be “fairly apportioned.” See
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), Container Corp. of Am.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159. This constitutional mandate applies even to a
Connecticut-based corporation with a modest out-of-state presence. By analogy,
a tax on all of the income of a Connecticut employer, regardless of where
generated, would violate the fair apportionment requirement, making a tax on all
of the payroll of a Connecticut employer equally suspect.
20
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link between the payroll tax and withholding on Connecticut residents
would be severed.22
On the other hand, the link remains intact in the case of nonresidents.
Wages of nonresidents are subject to Connecticut income tax
withholding if the wages are paid for services rendered in Connecticut.
Here it is more feasible and easier for both the DRS and employers to
administer the payroll tax if it covers the wages of nonresidents who
are subject to income tax withholding.
For administrative convenience, a special rule applies that treats a
nonresident employee who performs personal services for employment
purposes in Connecticut for 15 days or less as not subject to
Connecticut income taxation on those wages and consequently not
subject to withholding.23 That rule could obviously be relaxed for the
payroll tax but at the price of administrative complexity.
The 15-day rule is just one of the special rules that limit the reach of the
State’s personal taxing jurisdiction; other rules apply to limited
situations.24 If these rules were to apply to the payroll tax so that some
The Consultant could determine the extent of wages paid for services
performed out-of-state.
23 If a nonresident employee who was reasonably expected to work 15 or fewer
days in Connecticut during a calendar year actually works more than 15 days in
Connecticut during such year, the employer must withhold on all the
compensation paid to that nonresident employee for services performed in
Connecticut, including the compensation paid for the first 15 days.
24 For example, compensation paid by interstate rail carriers, interstate motor
carriers, and interstate motor private carriers to a nonresident employee who
performs regularly assigned duties in two or more states including Connecticut is
not subject to the State’s income tax and thus no withholding applies.
Compensation paid by an interstate air carrier to a nonresident employee who
performs regularly assigned duties on an aircraft in two or more states is
considered to be income derived from sources in both the employee’s state of
22
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Connecticut wages were outside the base of the tax, some revenue
would be lost. The Consultant would need to determine the amount
lost and whether the rules need to be relaxed or not, but any revenue
gained would come at the price of increased administrative complexity.
E. Expected Reduction in Wages
Employers are expected to shift the cost of the payroll tax to employees
by reducing their wages.25 In this manner, employers are held harmless
from the payroll tax.26 Because this reduction in wages would implicitly
be a proxy for employees paying a 5% personal income tax, the State
would reduce existing rates by 5 points. Otherwise, the same wages
residence and the state in which the employee earns more than 50% of the
compensation. An employee is considered as earning more than 50% of the
compensation in Connecticut if the scheduled flight time in Connecticut is more
than 50% of the total scheduled flight time in the calendar year. Other special
rules apply to seaman’s wages and military personnel. For a readable
presentation of the extensive rules, upon which my description is based, see
Connecticut Employer’s Tax Guide, https://portal.ct.gov//media/DRS/Publications/pubsip/2019/IP-2019(1).pdf?la=en.
25 This does not mean reducing wages by the full 5%. The cost of the payroll tax is
not equal to the 5%. See infra note 44.
The wages of an employee whose services would be performed entirely in
Connecticut could be reduced starting at the time the payroll tax became
effective. Employees who perform only some of their services in Connecticut in an
unpredictable manner because of their travel schedules create a unique situation.
It would only be after the fact that their Connecticut wages could be identified. In
other words, they may have a fixed salary for the year regardless of where they
work, but the services they perform in Connecticut may be variable and unknown
ex ante. This problem is less severe if the time spent in Connecticut does not vary
significantly from year-to-year.
26
As will be discussed, the employer will actually come out ahead by at least
saving the FICA taxes that would have otherwise been paid on the higher wages.
See infra Section III.G.
19

would be taxed twice; first, implicitly as employers reduced wages to
shift the payroll tax to the employee, and again, when those reduced
wages became subject to the pre-existing income tax rates.
To summarize, if the payroll tax works as intended, the State swaps a
5% payroll tax for a reduction in rates, and employers pass the cost of
the payroll tax onto employees through a concomitant wage reduction.
Focusing only on the Connecticut personal income tax, an employee
breaks even: the wage reduction would be offset by the income tax
savings from reducing rates. Once the federal personal income tax and
FICA taxes are taken into account, however, the employee comes out
ahead, as does the employer.
The rationale of the payroll tax assumes a tie-in. In sharp contrast, if
employees were to benefit from the rate reduction without any
reduction in wages, they would receive a windfall,27 and State revenue
would be needlessly lost.
If employers cannot shift the tax onto employees, the employers will
bear the cost of the tax. Then the payroll tax would become an added
cost for employers, and even worse, send the message that Connecticut
is anti-jobs. If the payroll tax transmorphs from a proxy for an income
tax, intended to fall on Connecticut employees through wage
reductions, to a tax on the employer, what would the effect be on jobs?
Would the tax constrain employment? Would employers pass the tax
backward to vendors, suppliers, and independent contractors? Would
employers pass the tax forward to consumers? Would Connecticut be
seen as anti-jobs? Would the tax add to Connecticut’s reputation as a
high tax state?

27

See supra Section III.B.
20

With no tie-in, the benefit of a rate reduction would be bestowed on
employees whose wages would not be reduced. Would that offset the
above concerns and demonstrate that Connecticut was not anti-jobs?
Would that tax cut encourage persons to seek employment in the
State?28 These are critical but difficult empirical questions.
It bears repeating that the belief that wages would be reduced to offset
the cost of the payroll tax to employers is central to the rationale of the
payroll tax. If that does not happen, the whole reason for having a
payroll tax is undermined.
F. The Payroll Tax as a Response to the Federal Cap on Itemized
Deductions
The initial impetus for the payroll tax was presumably the changes
implemented by the so-called 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“Act”).29 The
Act imposed the now infamous $10,000 cap on the federal itemized
deduction for state and local taxes under the Internal Revenue Code.
The cap is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2025.
The Connecticut School Finance Project (“Project”), known today as The
School and State Finance Project, deserves the credit for proposing a
payroll tax as one way of responding to the cap.

For the reasons discussed in the text accompanying supra note 18, the benefits
of eliminating the 5% rate probably cannot be limited to just those working in
Connecticut without raising the possibility of a constitutional issue. Revenue
considerations might require revisiting the constitutional issue in some depth.
29
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was the original name of the bill. Because of a ruling
by the Senate parliamentarian, the actual name is “An Act to provide for
reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the
budget for fiscal year 2018.”
28
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The State has challenged the legality of this cap in a case currently
before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.30 Even before the outcome
of this litigation, the 2020 election may result in eliminating the cap,
which the Democrats have made a priority.31
Prior to the cap, taxpayers who itemized rather than taking the
standard deduction on their federal income tax returns could deduct an
unlimited amount of their state and local taxes, which in turn would
reduce their federal income taxes.32 Connecticut has a disproportionate
number of itemizers with large SALT deductions. The cap thus has had a
substantial negative impact on Connecticut residents.33 DRS estimated
that the cap would affect 170,000 residents by reducing their SALT
itemized deduction by $10.3 billion, increasing their federal taxes by

New York v. Mnuchin, ___F. Supp. 3d ___, 2019 WL 4805709 (S.D.N.Y. 2019),
appeal docketed, No. 19-3962 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2019).
31 Representatives Thomas Suozzi, D-N.Y, Bill Pascrell, D-N.J., and Mike Thompson,
D-Calif., have recently proposed the “Restoring Tax Fairness for States and
Localities Act.” This bill increases the cap to $20,000 for married taxpayers who
file jointly in 2019, and phases it out over 2020 and 2021. The Bill would also raise
the top rate of the federal personal income tax to 39.6%. The Bill was passed by
the House on December 20, 2019 by a vote of 218-206. The President has
threatened to veto the Bill in the unlikely event it passes the Senate. Brittany De
Lea, Trump SALT Cap Veto Threat Doesn't Deter Democrats, Fox Business (Dec.
20, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/trump-veto-democrat-salt-capbill.
32 Because the starting point for determining the Connecticut income tax is
federal adjusted gross income, the federal election to itemize rather than take the
standard deduction, which reduces federal taxable income but not federal
adjusted income, has no effect on a taxpayer’s Connecticut income taxes.
33
The cap was just one part of sweeping changes made in 2017 and some
Connecticut taxpayers had a reduction in their federal income taxes despite the
cap.
30
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$2.8 billion.34 If employers are able to shift the cost of the payroll tax to
employees, with the concomitant reduction in their federal income and
FICA taxes, the resulting tax savings will offset the effect of the cap.
https://www.ctcpas.org/Content/Files/Pdfs/OLR2018Report.pdf. This is the
most recent data available. The $2.8 billion figure comes from Steve Wamhoff et
al., A Fair Way to Limit Tax Deductions, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy
(ITEP), (Nov. 14, 2018), https://itep.org/a-fair-way-to-limit-tax-deductions/. In the
interest of disclosure, I am on the Board of ITEP and the former President. The
Board does not approve any publications by the staff and those publications do
not necessarily represent the views of the Board.
About 8.4% of Connecticut taxpayers experienced a tax increase from the
Act. Frank Sammartino, et al., The Effect of the TCJA Individual Income Tax
Provisions Across Income Groups and Across the States, Tax Policy Center (Mar.
28, 2018),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/154006/the_effec
t_of_the_tcja_individual_income_tax_provisions_across_income_groups_and_ac
ross_the_states.pdf.
The payroll tax was one part of the State’s responses to the cap. Another
response was a new entity-level income tax on most pass-through businesses. PA
18-49, §§ 1-8. Connecticut was the first state to adopt this approach in 2018 and
is still the only state where this approach is mandatory. This pass-through entity
tax is levied at the top Connecticut personal income tax rate of 6.99% and offset
by a State personal or corporation income tax credit for the entity’s members.
Businesses can claim this tax as a deductible expense against their federal taxes
and pass the benefit of the deduction to their members. The IRS has not opined
on the legitimacy of the entity-level tax.
Another response was that the Legislature allowed municipalities to
provide a property tax credit to eligible taxpayers who make voluntary payments
to a municipally approved nonprofit that is organized exclusively to support
municipal spending on programs and services (i.e., community supporting
organizations). PA 18-49, § 10. The goal was to allow taxpayers who make these
payments to claim a federal charitable contribution deduction for the donation to
the nonprofit, in effect to substitute an uncapped charitable contribution for a
capped property tax deduction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Internal Revenue
Service has issued regulations to thwart this strategy. The State has challenged
34
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The Act also increased the standard deduction, which is an alternative
to the itemized deductions. This increase in the standard deduction
resulted in fewer taxpayers being subject to the cap; the ones that
continue to itemize tend to be higher-income individuals.35
As will be seen shortly, any reduction in wages reduces federal taxes for
both employees and employers independent of whether a cap exists or
not.36 Because of these federal tax consequence, debate over a payroll
tax should not be tied to that of the cap. Even if the cap were
eliminated, the proposal for a payroll tax has merits on its own because
of the reduction in federal taxes for both employees and employers.
And despite the cap being scheduled to expire on December 31, 2025,
no guarantees exist that this will happen.
G. Employers’ Response to a Payroll Tax
As already suggested, employers can respond to the payroll tax along a
continuum marked by two polar points.
The only response consistent with the rationale of the payroll tax would
be for an employer to pass the cost of the tax onto employees by
reducing their wages. If this occurs, the effect would be like that of a
5% State income tax. In a sense, the payroll tax would function as a
proxy for a State income tax by reducing wages, just like what an
income tax would do, but in this case the reduction would occur
through employers shifting the cost of the payroll tax onto employees.
these regulations. State of New Jersey et al v. Mnuchin et al, No. 1:19-cv-06642
(S.D.N.Y., filed July 17, 2019).
35
No publicly available data exist on the effect the increased standard deduction
had on reducing the number of itemizers in the State. The Consultant should be
able to provide this data.
36 See Section III.H.
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In other words, the reduction in the after-tax amount of wages that
would otherwise occur explicitly under the State’s existing income tax
rates would now occur implicitly through a reduction in wages
attributable to the payroll tax. The existing rates in the Connecticut
personal income tax would each be reduced by five points to eliminate
taxing these same wages a second time.
For simplicity, assume a single individual with $10,000 of wages paid a
5% tax --$500--on these wages, leaving the taxpayer with $9,500. After
the adoption of a 5% payroll tax, these wages would be reduced by
$500, to $9,500 and the 5% personal income on these wages would be
eliminated.
Assuming wages were reduced as in this example, three major
consequences would follow. First, an employee’s federal income tax
would be reduced. Second, reduced wages would mean lower FICA
taxes (Social Security and Medicare taxes).37 Consequently, a payroll tax
would increase an employee’s take-home pay at the expense of the
federal fisc,38 which is part of its State charm. Somewhat counterintuitively, even though wages are reduced, the combination of State
income tax savings and the federal income and FICA tax savings means
the employee is actually better off and will end up with more takehome pay.
FICA taxes are described in detail in Section III.I. FICA is a tax based on wages
and imposed on both employers and employees. FICA funds Social Security and
Medicare benefits. Consequently, reducing FICA taxes is not an unmitigated
benefit for employees because Social Security benefits are based in part on the
aggregate amount of FICA taxes paid. (Medicare benefits are not based on
wages.) Other contractual forms of retirement benefits are also based on wages.
38
It might seem that employers would benefit from the reduction in wages, but
that benefit would be offset by the payroll tax they would pay. See infra notes 5354 and accompanying text.
37
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A third consequence is that an employer would also pay less FICA taxes
because of the lower wages, and perhaps make less contributions to
pension plans if these were based on wages. Reduced FICA taxes would
be an advantage for the employer but not necessarily in the long-term
for the employee,39 although some employers might want to use part
of their FICA savings to offset the future loss in retirement benefits.
These consequences occur if employers are able to reduce wages by
the cost of the payroll tax. If, however, employers could not reduce
wages, the payroll tax would become an explicit tax on employers and
not an implicit tax on employees. No reduction in FICA taxes would
result. Wage earners, however, would nonetheless benefit from the
reduction in rates in the personal income tax, essentially receiving a
windfall with the State needlessly giving up revenue.
Put differently, if employers cannot reduce wages, they would be
saddled with a new 5% tax. If there were no tie-in and the benefits of
reducing rates were available whether wages were reduced or not,40
employees would benefit, and employers would lose. The payroll tax
would result in a major shift in the Connecticut income tax from
employees to employers.
H. Illustrative Examples
1. Effect on an Employee
To make the above discussion more concrete, consider a Connecticut
employer having a resident employee. Assume the employee is single
and has $80,000 of Connecticut adjusted gross income (AGI) attributed
solely to Connecticut wages. The employee is currently subject to a
39
40

See Section V.3.
See Section III.B.
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Connecticut income tax of $4,05041 and federal taxes (personal income
tax plus FICA taxes) of $17,020.42 The employee takes home $58,930
($80,000-$4,050-$17,020) after State and federal taxes. I will refer to
this as the pre-payroll tax benchmark (“benchmark”).
Assume a new 5% payroll tax were adopted and rates in the personal
income tax were reduced by five points with no tie-in. Two opposite
alternatives are possible.
If the employer could not reduce Connecticut wages to offset the
amount of the new tax, the payroll tax effectively becomes a new 5%
tax on the payment of its Connecticut wages. The employer would pay
a payroll tax of $4,000 (5% x $80,000).
Without a tie-in, the employee would nonetheless receive the benefit
of the rate reduction on Connecticut wages. The employee can be
viewed as getting a windfall because she received a tax benefit and did
not suffer any reduction in wages. The effect is that the 5% payroll tax
on Connecticut wages, intended to substitute for the pre-existing 5%
rate on those wages, simply becomes a tax on Connecticut employers
and a tax reduction for Connecticut employees.
The Connecticut employee would no longer pay the former State
income tax of $4,050, which is assumed to have been eliminated. She
See the 2018 Income Tax Tables accompanying the 2018 Form CT-1040 Booklet.
The taxpayer’s effective tax rate is 5.0625% ($4,050/$80,000). I am using 2018
rates to conform with the examples used by the Project.
42 For the convenience of the reader, the calculations in this example are based on
the Project’s excellent “FAQs: Proposal To Shift A Portion Of CT’s Income Tax To A
Payroll Tax, July 30, 2019, p.2. The Project assumed the taxpayer claims the
standard deduction and does not itemize, which is the only assumption it could
make without access to actual returns. The Consultant should have access to
actual Connecticut income tax returns and refine the examples used throughout
the text.
41
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would continue to pay the federal tax of $17,02043 and thus clears
$62,980 ($80,000-$17,020). Her take-home pay increases by $4,050
($62,980-$58,930), which is the amount of the State’s personal income
tax that she no longer would have to pay even though her wages were
not reduced. This is her optimal tax position: no State personal income
tax and no reduction in her wages. None of the other alternatives
below can provide a better tax result. This optimal tax position results
because there was no tie-in. For example, with a tie-in, she would not
get the benefit of eliminating the personal income tax and her take
home pay would remain at $58,930.
At the other extreme, assume the employer can reduce wages by the
amount of the payroll tax. Whether there is a tie-in or not would now
be irrelevant because in either event the employee would receive the
benefit of the reduction in the State’s personal income tax.
Assume the employer would reduce her Connecticut wages by 5% to
$76,000 ($80,000-[5% x $80,000]).44 Eliminating the State’s personal
Because of the assumption that the taxpayer claimed the standard deduction
and did not itemize her state taxes, her federal income tax will remain the same
regardless of the amount of her Connecticut income tax.
44 The wages actually would have to be reduced to slightly less than $4,000.
Wages have to be reduced to the point where the savings from the reduction in
wages is equal to the 5% tax on the new, lowered wages. Under this assumption,
the employer would reduce wages by $3,810 ($80,000/1.05) to $76,190. By
reducing the wages to $76,190, the payroll tax on the employer would be $3,810
(5% x $76,190), equal to the $3,810 the employer saved by reducing the wages to
$76,190 ($80,000-$76,190 = $3,810). I have generally not incorporated this
subtlety into the examples in the text in order to conform them to the Project’s
examples, which ignore this complication. But see infra note 53 where this
refinement is taken into account.
Employers using the payroll tax as a fig leaf to reduce wages by the greatest
amount feasible might also conveniently ignore this subtlety.
43
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income tax on her wages45 produces a savings of $4,050, the amount
that was previously paid in Connecticut income tax.
The payroll tax now functions as an implicit income tax because the
employee has borne the full amount of the payroll tax, as if it were an
income tax. Because her wages would have been reduced by only
$4,000, and she would save $4,050 in State tax, she comes out ahead
by $50.46
I have purposely picked a situation where the savings in State taxes
closely approximates the reduction in wages in order to isolate the
Connecticut tax impact from the federal tax impact. Because the
employee would break even at the State level, that is, the reduction in
wages would be offset by the Connecticut personal income tax savings,
any reduction in federal taxes would be a net benefit.
That benefit can be calculated as follows. The employee’s $4,000
reduction in wages would reduce her federal tax. The federal tax
(income and FICA47) on the lower wages would be $15,834. The
employee would now clear $60,166 ($76,000-$15,834). Her take-home
pay would increase by $1,236 over the benchmark ($60,166-$58,930).
There could be some State income tax depending on the new rate schedule
accompanying the payroll tax. See infra note 70 and accompanying rate schedule.
The Consultant should be in a position to simulate various Connecticut rate
schedules that could apply in coordination with whatever level of payroll tax is
eventually determined.
46 I intentionally picked a scenario where the employee essentially breaks even.
Working with DRS data, the Consultant would undoubtedly produce an exhaustive
list of possible outcomes under various assumptions. Working with only publicly
available data, the Project has also generated an illustrative chart of outcomes,
assuming a flat payroll tax rate of 5% and a progressive rate schedule on wages
ranging from .50% to 2.99%. See supra note 42 at p.3.
47
The 2020 changes in FICA, see Section III.I are ignored in the calculations in the
Report, which are all based on 2019 law.
45
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Even though her wages are reduced, the tax savings would be in excess
of that reduction and the taxpayer would come out ahead. But if
measured against her take home if her wages were not reduced and
there was no tie-in, she has $2,814 less in take home ($60,166$62,980). Without a tie-in, she would get the benefit of the reduction in
State income taxes despite having no reduction in her wages.
The following Table summarizes the above results.
Benchmark
Payroll Tax, No
Reduction in
Wages, No Tie in
Payroll Tax,
Reduction in
Wages (Tie In
Irrelevant)

CT AGI
$80,000

CT Inc. Tax
$4050

Fed Taxes
$17,020

Take Home
$58,930

$80,000

-

$17,020

$62,980

$76,000

-

$15,834

$60,166

Predictably, the best tax position in the Table--$62,980--results from
receiving the benefits of a reduction in the Connecticut income tax with
no reduction in wages. However, if employers can reduce wages by the
cost of the payroll tax, then the combination of the benefits from
reducing the State income tax and the reduction in federal personal
income taxes and FICA taxes, will increase the individual’s take home to
$60,166, which is greater than the benchmark, but not in excess of the
optimal take-home pay of $62,980.
Note the importance of the tie-in if wages were not reduced. With a
tie-in, an employee would receive no reduction in State income taxes
and her take home would remain unchanged at $58,930. Without a tiein, the employee receives a windfall, and her take home increases to
$62,980.
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The Project has provided simulations for other taxpayers, all of which
assume a reduction in salary of 5%. Whether there is a tie-in or not is
irrelevant under that assumption and not analyzed by the Project.
As another illustration, consider that before the adoption of a payroll
tax, a married couple taking the standard deduction earning $200,000
in Connecticut wages would pay $10,500 in Connecticut income taxes
and $42,823 in federal taxes, clearing $146,677 ($200,000-$10,500$42,823). If their wages were reduced by the 5% payroll tax, their
Connecticut AGI would be reduced to $190,000,48 and their federal
taxes would be reduced to $40,278. For simplicity, assume they would
pay no Connecticut income tax going forward on their reduced wages49
because of the five-point reduction in the brackets. They would now
clear $149,722 ($190,000-$40,278), for an increase in their take-home
pay of $3,045 ($149,722-$146,677).50 The reduction in wages of
$10,000 is more than offset by the $13,045 reduction in aggregate
taxes. (A reduction of $10,500 in the State income tax, and a savings of
$2,545 in the federal taxes,51 generates a total federal and State savings

This assumes a 5% reduction in wages rather than a slightly less reduction. See
supra note 44.
49
This would depend on the any new personal income tax rate schedule that was
adopted with the payroll tax. Under the rate schedule accompanying infra note
70, they would be in the 1% bracket.
50 I assume no Connecticut income tax post-payroll tax in order to maximize the
amount of the increase in their tax-home pay. I do this in order to identify the
amount that would be available to be shared with the State. The Project
calculates the new Connecticut income tax using the rate structure put forth in
the Act establishing the Commission. See infra note 70 and accompanying rate
schedule. Also, the Project assumes wages are reduced by 5% whereas I would
use a slightly different calculation. See supra note 44.
51 $42,823-$40,278=$2,545.
48
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of $13,045.52 The savings are $3,045 greater than the reduction in
wages ($13,045-$10,000=$3,045)).
2. Effect on Employer
Assuming the employer could reduce an employee’s Connecticut wages
to offset the payroll tax, its state and federal corporate income taxes
would remain the same. To illustrate, instead of deducting in the prior
example $80,000 in wages prior to the payroll tax, it would continue to
deduct that same total amount, but that would now consist of a
combination of a deduction of wages of $76,19053 and a deduction for
the payroll tax on those reduced wages of $3,81054 ($76,190+$3810 =
$80,000).
If the employer could not reduce the Connecticut wages and would
have to absorb the payroll tax, it would bear a new 5% tax. This tax
would be deductible as a cost of doing business, the same way wages
or other costs of business are deductible. The payroll tax would reduce
the employer’s taxable income under both the federal corporate
income tax and the state’s corporate income tax.
The employer would be subject to a federal corporate rate of 21% so
that every $100 of deductible payroll tax would reduce its federal
corporate income tax by $21. That reduction would mitigate the impact
of the new payroll tax. The $100 payroll tax would have a net cost to
the employer of $79 after considering the reduction in federal taxes.

$10,500+$2,545=$13,045.
For the purpose of this analysis, I have dropped the simplifying assumption that
wages would be reduced by $4,000 to $76,000. See supra note 44.
54 5% x $76,190=$3809.50
52
53
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The deduction of the payroll tax would also reduce the State’s business
tax liability,55 which is the greater of the net income base tax and the
capital base tax. The capital base tax is calculated by levying a rate of
0.31% to the apportioned capital base. The tax on the net income base
is 7.5% of apportioned Connecticut net income, with a 10% surtax for
corporations with total income of at least $100 million. Other nuances
exist. The State’s corporate income tax is a function of how much
income a corporation apportions to Connecticut. Various
apportionment formulas are provided depending on the type of
activities in which a corporation engages. These complexities defy
straightforward modeling. Presumably, only a small number of
corporations pay the bulk of the corporation business tax, and the
Consultant should have access to their returns for precise calculations.
I. Unbundling FICA taxes56
The amount of the individual federal tax in the above examples consists
of two different components, which for ease of presentation were
bundled together and referred to simply as “federal taxes.” The first
part is the amount of the federal personal income tax, which would be
reported on Form 1040.
Employers and employees, however, also pay taxes under the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”). FICA taxes are composed of the
old-age, survivors, and disability insurance taxes, commonly known as
Social Security taxes, and the hospital insurance tax, commonly known
This Report assumes the employer is taxable as a C Corporation. Pass-through
entities would also be subject to the payroll tax, as would S Corporations. The
Consultant would have the ability to sort through these distinctions.
56
See generally, Understanding Employment Taxes,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/understandingemployment-taxes.
55
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as the Medicare tax. Different rates and rules apply for these taxes.
FICA taxes apply to wages, so the lower the wage, the lower the FICA
tax. To the extent employers lower wages to pass through the cost of
the payroll tax, both the employer’s and the employee’s FICA taxes will
be reduced.
The current tax rate for Social Security is 6.2% for the employer and
6.2% for the employee. The current tax rate for Medicare is 1.45% for
the employer and 1.45% for the employee, or 2.9% total. Consequently,
the combined rate is 7.65% (6.2%+1.45%).
The 2020 social security wage base is $137,700 (an increase of $4,800
from $132,900 in 2019). This wage base is the maximum amount of
wages that is subject to the tax for that year.
The maximum social security tax employees and employers pay in 2020
is $8,537.40 (6.2% X $137,700), an increase of $297.60 from the
$8,239.80 maximum in 2019. Only the social security tax has a wage
base limit ($137,700); the Medicare tax has none.
Not only is the Medicare tax unlimited in amount, but also an additional
0.9% applies to individuals with annual earned income of more than
$200,000, and married couples filing jointly with such income of more
than $250,000. Employers withhold this additional 0.9% Medicare tax.
There is no employer match for this 0.9% additional Medicare Tax. The
combined rate of social security tax and the Medicare Tax can exceed
7.65%.57
Connecticut also imposes a State unemployment tax only on employers. The tax
is levied on the first $15,000 of an employee’s wages. The rate varies between
1.9% and 6.8% based on the experience an employer has had with the
unemployment of its employees. New employers, which have no experience, are
subject to a rate of 3.4%. Because it is impossible to talk about this tax in the
abstract, and given its relatively low amount, I have ignored it from all
57
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The employer can deduct the FICA taxes that it collects on behalf of its
employees’ wages as well as the FICA taxes it pays on its own behalf;
these are part of its deductible business expenses. Employees cannot
deduct the FICA taxes that their employer collects on their behalf nor
can they deduct the FICA taxes that they pay on their own accord.
In the example above of the single employee whose $80,000 of wages
was reduced by $4,000, the employer and employee each saved 7.65%
x $4,000, or $306 in FICA taxes. That savings was part of the reduction
of federal taxes from $17,020 to $15,834; the rest was the reduction in
the federal income tax.
For businesses with large payrolls, the savings in FICA taxes can be
significant. The Project created a representative model for Connecticut
hospitals, which had 103,000 employees and a $7.6 billion payroll;
which would have paid FICA taxes of $581,400,000.58 After the
imposition of a 5% payroll tax and a concomitant reduction in wages,
payroll would be reduced to $7.220 billion, reducing FICA taxes to
$552,330,000 for a total savings in FICA taxes of $29,070,000
($581,400,000-$552,330,000). The savings in salary would be
$380,000,000 ($7.6 billion-$7.220 billion). The total savings in FICA
taxes and salary would be $409,070,000 ($29,070,000+$380,000,000).
After paying the payroll tax of $361,000,000, the hospitals would save
$48,070,000. Of course, if the hospitals could not reduce their wages
calculations, as has the Project. I have also ignored the federal unemployment
tax, as has the Project, whose rate is 6.0%. That tax applies to the first $7,000 paid
to each employee as wages during the year. In general, if wages were subject to
the Connecticut unemployment tax, there would be a credit of up to 5.4% for that
tax against the federal tax.
58
See https://www.hartforbusiness.com/article/report-ct-hospitals-healthsystems-generate-27b-for-economy. That the hospitals may be non-profit does
not excuse them from paying FICA taxes, any more than the State, municipalities,
or school boards are excused from paying FICA taxes.
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(or shift the payroll tax backward or forward), their costs would
increase by $361,000,000, the full amount of the payroll tax.
The discussion above focused on the fiscal impact of the FICA taxes on
employers and employees. What follows is a summary of the fiscal
impact on Connecticut and on the federal government.
J. Effect on State and Federal Corporate Income Taxes from Reduced
FICA Taxes
An employer deducts the FICA taxes imposed on it and the FICA taxes it
collects on behalf of employees. If wages were reduced and FICA taxes
were concomitantly reduced, an employer’s federal and state
corporate income tax would increase because a deduction that it
previously had for FICA taxes would now be reduced. That in turn,
would increase its taxable income. Nevertheless, the savings from
paying less FICA taxes would outweigh the increase in the federal
corporate income tax and the state corporate income tax so the net
effect would be an overall reduction in federal and state corporate
income taxes.
To illustrate, assuming a federal corporate rate of 21%, every $1,000
savings in FICA taxes would increase the federal tax by $210. The
employer would have a net gain of $790 ($1,000-$210).59 From the
federal government’s perspective, the increase in federal corporate
income tax of $210 would help offset the $1,000 reduction in FICA
taxes, which are paid into a trust fund, separate from the government’s
general revenue.

59

This is the same type of calculation for the payroll tax (or any deduction).
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The State receives none of the FICA taxes, so the reduced payment
does not affect its revenue. The State would, however, receive revenue
from the new payroll tax.
K. Effect on Connecticut and Federal Revenue from the Payroll Tax
Whether wages are reduced or not, the payroll tax would be a new
source of revenue for the State. It would also be deductible by
employers, just like wages. But the State would come out ahead as
illustrated below.
If wages were not reduced, the payroll tax would become a net new
business deduction. The federal corporate income tax would be
reduced by the new deduction and not be offset by any revenue from
the State’s payroll tax. For example, assuming a federal corporate rate
of 21%, every $1,000 of deductions for the new Connecticut payroll tax
would reduce the federal corporate income tax by $210.
The Connecticut corporate income tax would also be reduced, which
would offset the amount of revenue from the payroll tax. But overall,
the State would come out ahead. To illustrate in the case of an
intrastate corporation paying the corporate income tax at a 7.5% rate, a
$1,000 payroll tax would reduce the State corporate income tax by $75
($1,000 x 7.5%). The State comes out ahead by $925 ($1,000-$75).
If the cost of the payroll tax is fully shifted to employees by reducing
their wages, an employer would deduct the same amount as it
previously did,60 which would have no effect on the federal or the State
corporate income tax.

60

See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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The reduced wages would, however, would reduce the federal personal
income tax and the FICA taxes paid by both the employee and the
employer. The federal government comes out a loser.
L. Minimum-Wage Earners
The Legislature recently increased the minimum wage in Connecticut
from its current level of $10.10 to $11.00 on October 1, 2019; to $12.00
on September 1, 2020; to $13.00 on August 1, 2021; $14.00 on July 1,
2022; and finally, to $15.00 on June 1, 2023. An employer cannot
unilaterally change these amounts. Accordingly, employers would not
be able to reduce wages below these amounts to offset the cost of a
payroll tax.
One way of dealing with this constraint would be to exempt the wages
of minimum wage employees from the base of the payroll tax.
Otherwise, the payroll tax would be a cost of doing business and reduce
profits, increase the prices paid to customers, reduce payments to
suppliers or independent contractors, or some combination thereof. In
extreme cases, a low-profit business with a high number of minimum
wage earners could otherwise pay more in the payroll tax than it has in
profits.
Minimum-wage earners are unlikely to be above whatever threshold
for paying income taxes the Legislature chooses, so that the issue of a
tie-in would be irrelevant. But they might be married and filing a joint
return with a spouse and have income above the threshold. This
introduces yet another complexity in designing the payroll tax.
M. Low-Income Wage Earners
For low-income persons, defined as those below the current 5%
marginal tax bracket, their reduction in wages by the amount of the
38

payroll tax would not be offset by the aggregate federal and
Connecticut tax savings that would result, and they would be worse off.
For example, before the imposition of a payroll tax, a single individual
with Connecticut AGI of $40,000 of Connecticut wages would pay a
Connecticut income tax of 3.5%, or $1,395, and estimated federal taxes
of $6,230. This individual would take home $32,375 ($40,000-$1,395$6,230=$32,375).
Assuming after the adoption of a 5% payroll tax, her Connecticut wages
would be reduced by $2,000 to $38,000,61 her State personal income
tax would be eliminated, and her federal tax would be reduced to
$5,837. Her new take home would be $32,163 ($38,000-$5,837), less
than before the payroll tax was adopted. The reason why she is worse
off is that her Connecticut income tax savings of $1,395 and her federal
tax savings of $393 ($6,230-$5,837) combine for a total of only $1,788
($1,395+$393), which is $212 less than the $2,000 reduction in wages.62
Unlike higher-income taxpayers whose take home increases, hers
decreases.
A refundable tax credit would be one way of dealing with this
situation.63 At the least, the credit would have to hold harmless every
The actual reduction could be slightly less. See supra note 44.
The numbers in the text come from the Project, supra note 42. The reduction in
wages overstates the amount needed to hold the employer harmless. The
reduction needed to do so would be $1,905. See supra note 44, but that would
not change the essential fact that this individual would be worse off after a
payroll tax without any concomitant relief.
63 Because of the opportunities for fraud, refundable credits are controversial.
The refundable Earned Income Tax Credit, which has complicated rules, has a high
error rate, which some attribute to fraud, but others attribute to unintentional
errors reflecting the difficulty of dealing with the complexity. See, e.g., Robert
Greenstein, et al., Reducing Overpayments in the Earned Income Tax Credit,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Jan. 31, 2019),
61
62
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individual below the current 5% bracket, so no one would be worse off
after the adoption of the payroll tax, a reduction in wages, and a
reduction in rates. The credit could be phased out at the point where
the reduction in wages were equal to, or less than, the savings in state
and federal taxes.64 Subject to revenue considerations, the credit could
be even more generous than the hold-harmless amount and actually
make everyone subject to the credit better off.65
The preceding discussion assumed that the employer could reduce an
employee’s wages. But if that did not occur, a refundable tax credit
would be uncalled for. The State might wish to provide one for other
reasons, but it would not be dictated by the rationale of the payroll tax.
Without a tie-in, low-income employees would receive the benefit of a
reduction in rates, even though their wages had not been reduced. No
relief would be required. If a tie-in existed, however, employees would
not receive any relief from the reduction in rates because they did not
experience any reduction in their wages. They would remain in the
same income tax position both before and after the adoption of the
payroll tax.

https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/reducing-overpayments-in-theearned-income-tax-credit; Joel Barker, et al., Billions Lost Yearly to Earned Income
Tax Credit: Errors or Fraud?, 14 J. Bus. Econ. Res. 145 (2016), Lynnley Browning,
I.R.S. Targets Hartford on Tax Credit, N.Y. Times (Oct. 24, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/nyregion/irs-targets-hartford-on-taxcredit.html, What is the Earned Income Tax Credit?, Tax Policy Center,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-earned-income-tax-credit.
The DRS should be consulted on designing a refundable low-income credit.
64
The Project estimates this would occur for a single person having Connecticut
AGI of $50,000. See supra note 42 at p. 3.
65
In theory, this would increase the incentive for fraud. See id. The Consultant
could simulate various combinations of rates and credits.
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N. A New Rate Schedule: Version One
Current Connecticut Personal Income Tax Rates range from 3% to
6.99% on Connecticut AGI. The proposed payroll tax rate is 5%. The goal
is to substitute the proposed 5% payroll tax on employers paying
Connecticut wages with a 5% reduction in the personal income tax. This
would be accomplished by the employer shifting the payroll tax onto its
employees by reducing their Connecticut wages by the cost of the
payroll tax, and by the State reducing every existing bracket in the
personal income tax by five points, which would eliminate the existing
5% and 3% brackets.66
For example, someone now subject to the highest marginal tax rate of
6.99% (single filers with an AGI of $500,000) would become subject to a
1.99% (6.99%-5%) rate. Each lower bracket until 5% would be similarly
reduced by five points. The resulting brackets would be 0.5%, (5.5%5%), 1% (6%-5%), 1.5% (6.5%-5%), 1.9% (6.9%-5%), and 1.99% (6.995%). The 5% and 3% brackets would be eliminated. Presumably, these
lower rates would create favorable publicity for Connecticut.
Two difficulties arise with this approach. First, the assumption in
lowering these brackets is that wages were actually reduced by the 5%
payroll tax. That reduction was equivalent to paying a 5% income tax. In
other words, the schedule implicitly assumes a tie-in. This is a critical
point discussed above.67 If Connecticut wages were not reduced, the
new rates would provide a windfall. Once again, the importance of a
tie-in is demonstrated to implementing the rationale of a payroll tax.

Alternatively, the brackets above 5% could be left unadjusted so the first one
would start at 5.5%.
67 See Section III.B.
66
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Second, with no tie-in, a potential constitutional issue of discriminating
against interstate commerce exists. Any tax reduction limited to only
Connecticut wages would be suspect, and might have to be extended to
all wages, including those for services performed out-of-state, even if
the payroll tax did not cover those.68 Any approach that taxed wages
for services performed outside the state at a higher rate than
Connecticut wages would be constitutionally suspect.
If the revenue at stake between extending the new brackets to all
wages and extending it to only Connecticut wages is not great, the
more cautious approach is to let all wages benefit. Besides avoiding any
administrative problems, the possible constitutional issue would be
avoided. If, however, the revenue is substantial, the constitutional issue
would justify a more thorough analysis.
If a tie-in existed, there would now be a reason for not extending the
benefits of a tax reduction to all wages. The reason would be that if
wages were not reduced, the wage earner would not be entitled to the
benefits of a tax reduction. Presumably, there would be Connecticut
wages that were not reduced, and these would also not benefit from
the rate reduction. Taxpayers with out of state wages that were not
reduced could not argue that their treatment was based on geography.
The disparate treatment would not be based on geography, but rather
on whether wages had been reduced. The fact that there would be
Connecticut wages not benefiting from the rate reduction in addition to
out-of-state wages should provide a defense to a constitutional attack.

68

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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If the individual had non-wage income such as dividends, capital gains,
interest, rents and the like, the policy underlying the payroll tax would
not require these items should benefit from a rate reduction.69
One lesson to draw from the preceding is that three rate schedules
might co-exist: one for wage income that was reduced, one for wage
income that was not reduced, and one for non-wage income.
O. A New Rate Schedule: Version Two
Because of Connecticut’s large per capita income, high-income
individuals would save significant amounts of federal income tax and
FICA taxes from a reduction in wages coupled with a State tax
reduction. Even if there were no reduction in wages, they would still
save from the lowered rates, assuming no tie-in.
The bill passed by the General Assembly seeks to share in this savings
by increasing the brackets in Version One above by one point, starting
with the current 6.5% bracket, which would otherwise have been
reduced to 1.5% (6.5%-5%). Accordingly, the 1.5% bracket would now
become 2.5%, the 1.9% bracket (6.9%-5%) would become 2.9%, and the
1.99% bracket (6.99%-5%) would become 2.99%.

The issue is similar to the discussion about who should receive the benefits of
eliminating the 5% rate. See Section III.B.
69
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The proposed rate schedule would be as follows:70

AGI Single Filer

AGI Joint Filers

Existing Personal
Income Tax
Rate

Payroll Tax

$0
$10,000
$50,000
$100,000
$200,000
$250,000
$500,000

$0
$20,000
$100,000
$200,000
$400,000
$500,000
$1,000,000

3.00%
5.00%
5.50%
6.00%
6.50%
6.90%
6.99%

5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%

Proposed New
Income Tax
Rate with
Payroll Tax
0.00%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
2.50%
2.90%
2.99%

This rate schedule is teed off of the 5% rate. The Commission would
have to decide whether to carry over the existing exemptions in the
current rate schedule to this new one, and how to allocate any
exemption, if at all, between income from wages and income from nonwages. In addition, the Commission would have to decide how to apply
the existing recapture rules. The Consultant should be able to calculate
the revenue aspects of these decisions and how many residents at
different income levels would owe how much income tax.71
P. Commuters
1. Connecticut Residents Commuting to other States
Suppose a Connecticut resident commutes to New York and earns all of
her income there. Under existing law, she would pay New York State
The rates are set forth in P.A. 19-117, Sec. 385, the statute creating the
Commission.
71
The Project estimates that 2/3 of current Connecticut taxpayers would no
longer owe any State income tax, supra note 42 at p.3.
70
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income tax and receive a credit for that tax against the Connecticut
income tax. Because New York’s rates are generally higher than
Connecticut’s, it is likely that she would pay no Connecticut income tax
because the credit for the higher New York income taxes would offset
the lower Connecticut income taxes. The commuter would bear the
higher rate of New York income taxes. No double taxation would result.
If Connecticut adopts a payroll tax, and assuming it would not apply to
her non-Connecticut wages,72 she would be in essentially the same
position as before. Even if Connecticut were to apply the payroll tax to
her wages and the employer reduced her wages accordingly, she would
still bear no Connecticut income tax because the credit for the New
York income tax would fully offset her Connecticut income tax, which
would be lower than before because of the reduction in her wages. She
will still continue to be taxed at the higher New York rate.
Suppose the resident commutes to a state with a lower rate of income
tax than Connecticut, e.g., New Hampshire, which does not tax wages.
There would be no New Hampshire income tax to credit, and the
resident would now bear the full amount of the Connecticut income tax
whether her wages remained the same or were reduced. Conceptually,
her situation would be the same after the adoption of a payroll tax as it
was before.
2. Resident of another State Commuting to Connecticut
Suppose a New York resident commutes to Connecticut and earns all of
her income here. New York would give the commuter a credit for the
Connecticut personal income tax. Because the rate of the Connecticut
income tax is generally less than that of New York, the commuter
would pay the difference in rates to New York. The net effect is that the
72

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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commuter from New York would pay tax to both Connecticut and New
York, at a combined rate that would be no higher than the New York
rate. No double taxation would result.
The commuter would be earning Connecticut wages, clearly subject to
the payroll tax. Whether or not those wages were reduced by the cost
of the payroll tax, and whether or not a tie-in existed, New York would
presumably still credit the resulting Connecticut tax against her New
York tax. Conceptually she is in the same situation both before and
after the payroll tax in that her total rate of income tax will be set by
New York.
IV. Grand Summary: From the Weeds to the Forest
Getting into the weeds of the payroll proposal is essential to
understand its strengths and weaknesses but can be distracting from
seeing the forest. The best way to summarize the above examples and
discussion is as follows.
Employers would have a new 5% payroll tax imposed on the payment
of their Connecticut wages, the cost of which is assumed would be
passed onto employees through a 5% reduction in their Connecticut
wages. In Version One, existing brackets in the personal income tax
would be reduced by five points—whether eliminated only if wages
were reduced is a critical policy question. A refundable credit would
hold harmless low-income persons below the 5% rate and thus
preserve the progressivity in the existing personal income tax. In
Version Two, the three highest brackets would be increased by one
point.
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But there is more, which goes to the heart of the proposal. Many
employees would have a reduction in their federal income taxes,73 and
a reduction in their FICA taxes, both attributable to their reduced
wages.74 This savings, combined with the reduction in the State income
tax, would be greater than the reduction in their wages. Their takehome pay would increase, despite the reduction in wages. And the
higher the income, the greater these savings.
Employers who were able to reduce wages would benefit from the
reduced FICA taxes on those lower wages. The reduction in wages and
the reduction in FICA taxes would more than offset the amount of the
payroll tax they would pay. Some would have additional savings from
reducing contributions to retirement plans that are tied to wages;
others might use part of their FICA savings to offset the future
reduction in retirement benefits of their employees.
The new progressive income tax rate schedule for wages that has been
proposed (Version Two) would share with the State some of the
benefits accruing to higher-income individuals.
Using recently released individual income tax data by the DRS for
calendar year 2018, the Project has estimated the following major
effects, based on Version Two and on the assumption that wages would
be reduced by the amount of the payroll tax.75 They do not consider the
federal or Connecticut corporate income taxes. The Project’s estimates
follow:

This reduction would be attributable to the reduced income tax on their now
lower wages.
74
Reduced FICA taxes and wages could reduce retirement benefits. See Section
V.1.
75 School and State Finance Project Financial Model dated Jan. 31, 2020.
73
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An annual increase in Connecticut taxes would be approximately $586
million, attributable to revenue from the payroll tax less the revenue
lost from the States income tax reductions. This net revenue increase
would be offset by the cost of the low-income taxpayer credit.
Determining this cost requires access to taxpayer data that is not
publicly available but could be determined by the Consultant.
Annual savings to Connecticut businesses would be approximately $814
million. This amount represents the savings from a 5% reduction in
wages, plus the savings from reduced FICA taxes, less the amount paid
in payroll taxes.
Annual savings to individuals would be approximately $901 million.
These savings come from reduced federal income taxes, reduced FICA
taxes, and reduced Connecticut personal income taxes, less reductions
in wages.
The net loser is the federal government. It loses approximately $2.3
billion annually, consisting of $1.5 billion of reduced federal income
taxes and $800 million from reduced FICA taxes.
The Consultant would have access to DRS data, which would allow it to
refine the above estimates.
V. Will an Employer be able to Reduce Wages to Offset the Cost of the
new Payroll Tax?
The key to implementing the rationale of the payroll tax is an
employer’s ability to shift the tax to employees through a reduction in
their wages. If wages were reduced by the cost of the payroll tax,
employers would benefit by the reduced amount of the FICA taxes that
they would pay on the lower wages (partially offset by an increase in
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their federal and State income taxes from having a smaller deduction
for their FICA taxes).
Employees would also benefit. The tax savings, both federal and State,
would offset, and in some cases considerably offset, the reduction in
wages. But employees can be excused for suspecting something cannot
be right about a proposition that seems so counter intuitive—being
better off with lower wages. It will require careful explanation with
easy to understand charts, graphics, and simulations. Because
employers would save FICA taxes on the reduced wages, they would
have a strong incentive to educate their employees that less is actually
more. Employers would also have reduced contributions to retirement
accounts, although some employers might choose to use part of their
FICA savings to offset otherwise reduced pension benefits.
If, however, wages cannot be reduced, employers would bear the full
cost of the payroll tax and continue to pay the full amount of the
existing FICA taxes. How employees would fare would depend on
whether a tie-in existed. If wages were not reduced, and if no tie-in
existed, lower-income taxpayers would receive a windfall from the
refundable low-income credit, the premise of which is that they have
borne the burden of the payroll tax. Other taxpayers would also receive
a windfall. They would receive the benefit of the States income tax
reductions without any concomitant reduction in their wages. They
would have the best of all worlds. Their take-home pay would increase
because of their Connecticut income tax savings and they would suffer
no reduction in their wages.
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1. Existing contracts controlling wages and wage increases.
In the short-term, union contracts govern and control employee
wages.76 Unless renegotiated, these contracts would prevent
employers from offsetting the cost of a payroll tax through an
immediate wage reduction.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,77 16.7% of employees
(280,000) in Connecticut are union members and workers who report
no union affiliation, but whose jobs are covered by a union or an
employee association contract. Unions have traditionally exercised
power in excess of what this number might suggest. Unless there were
overwhelming support for a payroll tax among the rank and file, it is
doubtful that these contracts could be renegotiated in the short-term.
Alternatively, instead of an immediate reduction in negotiated wages,
an employer might be able to recover the cost of a payroll tax by
modifying future wage increases. Suppose in a pre-payroll tax world an
employer planned on a 2% increase in wages going forward.78 This
increase could be reduced in amount, in its timing, or both combined.
There may be other benefits an employer was contemplating that
would now be dropped from consideration.

https://www.bls.gov/regions/new-england/newsrelease/unionmembership_massachusettsandconnecticut.htm.
77
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/regions/newengland/newsrelease/unionmembership_massachusettsandconnecticut.htm#umtable1.f.1.
78 See supra note 42 at pp. 5-6.
76
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There may be non-union, private sector contracts with employees that
already guarantee annual increases. These would have to be
renegotiated as well.
The longer the period between the adoption of a payroll tax and its
effective date, the more time employers would have to implement
various strategies for adjusting wages. Otherwise, an employer would
bear the cost of the tax and be unable in the short-term to pass it
forward to employees. In addition, the 5% rate could be phased in over
a period of years, which is what New York has done.
2. The Special Case of the State as an Employer
The State wears three hats. It is an employer and like any non-profit
employer, it pays FICA taxes, which it has an incentive to reduce. If the
payroll tax were imposed on it, another hat would be that of a
taxpayer. The third hat would be that of the recipient of the payroll tax
revenues. The second and third hats worn together mean that the tax is
a wash and imposes no actual cost on the State that it has to shift onto
its employees. This distinguishes it from all other employers, non-profit
or otherwise, which have actual costs that they have to worry about
reducing. One way of their doing so is by reducing wages. The State is
under no similar pressure to do so.
Suppose that the reduction in State income taxes is extended to all
wage earners, whether their salaries are reduced or not; in other
words, no tie-in exists. The State has no need to reduce employee
wages by 5% because there is no cost imposed by the payroll tax that
has to be shifted. Yet if the State does nothing, the effect would be that
State employees would receive a raise equal to the personal income
taxes they no longer have to pay. This result may present a political
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problem if other taxpayers view the payroll tax as a disguised raise for
State employees.
With no tie-in, State employees would already be in the best tax
position possible. They would have received an increase in their take
home pay from the reduction in State income taxes, without any
reduction in their wages. But without a reduction in their wages, the
State will not receive the benefits of reducing its payroll, reducing its
FICA taxes, (and perhaps making smaller contributions to pension
plans). These savings would have otherwise helped pay for the loss in
revenue from reducing the State income tax.
From the perspective of State employees, they would be in the same
position as employees of other employers that would be unable to
reduce the wages of their employees and would have to absorb the
payroll tax. Without a tie-in, those employees would also get the
benefit of the reduction in State income taxes without any reduction in
wages. Unlike all other employers, however, the State cannot convince
its employees of the need to pass through the “cost” of the payroll tax
because there would be no actual cost.
The dilemma is whether State employees should receive a windfall like
other employees of employers who cannot reduce wages (assuming no
tie-in), or whether the State should make some kind of adjustment to
recapture some or all of the benefits of the reduction in State income
taxes, in other words, some kind of ad hoc tie-in. No doubt strong
opposition to any recapture can be expected from employees and their
unions.
The real defect in this situation is that the benefit generated by
reducing the State income tax is not tied to a reduction in wages. If
there were a tie-in, State employees would be better off if the payroll
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tax were paid by the State and their wages reduced, which could
reduce their opposition.
Assuming no tie-in, three major options exist. One, impose the payroll
tax on the State, and attempt to reduce its employee wages
accordingly, generating savings from the reduction in wages and in its
FICA taxes. Without a tie-in, however, why would employees and their
unions accept this? The employees are already in the optimal tax
position: a reduction in State income taxes with no offsetting wage
reduction.
Two, do not impose the payroll tax on the State and let its employees
benefit from the lack of a tie-in and the reduction in the State income
tax. The difficulty would be the loss in revenue and the possible adverse
public perception that State employees have been given a raise.
Three, do not impose the payroll tax on the State and recapture some
or all of the benefits from the rate reduction. In a sense, this would be
tantamount to a full or partial tie-in and would presumably face strong
union resistance.
On the other hand, if a tie-in existed, employees would have two
choices. First, they could support a payroll tax imposed on the State
and accept a reduction in wages, and in return receive the benefits of
the reduction in State income taxes, lowered FICA taxes, and lowered
federal income taxes, leading to an increase in their take home pay.
Their retirement benefits, however, might be reduced because of lower
FICA taxes or reduced State contributions to their pensions, but the
State could use part of its FICA savings to offset the reduced retirement
benefits.
Second, State employees could vote for the status quo: rejecting any
benefit from reducing State income taxes and rejecting any reduction in
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salary. The latter, of course, would leave them in the same position that
they are in today.
New York State did not opt into its elective payroll tax, but it gave no
reasons for its decision.
3. Employee Perceptions
One of the biggest potential obstacles to support for a payroll tax, even
with a tie-in, would be employee resistance. Employees are simply used
to negotiating for pay increases, not accepting reductions. A tie-in
would change that traditional thinking. The reduction in wages would
be offset by the reduction in State income taxes, and when the federal
income and FICA savings are taken into account, most employees
would be better off, and their take-home pay would increase.
Employees need to understand the underlying arithmetic and why they
would come out ahead in take-home pay despite their wages being
reduced—why less is more. Detailed spread sheets produced by the
Consultant, based on information available from the DRS, and a fullfledged public information campaign would be required as part of that
educational process.
Another potential obstacle is that employees’ Social Security benefits
are tied to their earnings history. Lower wages can translate into lower
benefits. Americans are notoriously poor savers,79 and many retire with
"About half of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings (such as
in a 401(k) plan or an IRA) . . . Social Security provides most of the income for
about half of households age 65 or older." U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO15-419, Retirement Security: Most Households Approaching Retirement Have Low
Savings, p.2 (2015); “[A]ccording to a July 2019 ‘GoBankingRates.com’ survey,
42% of Americans risk reaching retirement age, without having sufficient savings
to see them through the rest of their lives. The same survey found that nearly half
of Americans polled had less than $10,000 set aside for their later years. Rebecca
79
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little other than Social Security.80 Employer pensions and contributions
to deferred savings vehicles are also similarly tied to wages, which
means that reduced wages today would translate into lower benefits
tomorrow.
To be sure, if the increased take-home pay were invested over a
sufficiently long period of time, an employee might come out ahead
upon retirement, but this calls for discipline, a degree of financial
sophistication, and perhaps serendipity. But financial planners can be
expected to participate in this potential new market by offering
specially tailored savings options. Also, simulations by the Consultant
could facilitate an employee’s decision making.
Because of the FICA taxes they would save, employers would have
strong incentives to help employees evaluate their options and
encourage them to support a reduction in wages. And employers could

Lake, 60 Years Old and No Retirement Savings, The Balance (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/retiring-without-savings-at-60-years-old-4161009.
“As of 2013, the median retirement account balance among all households 55 to
64 was only $14,500. Even after excluding all households that had saved nothing,
the median account balance of near-retirement households was still only
$104,000. If a household uses all of this money to purchase an annuity from a life
insurance company that will pay a guaranteed monthly income for the rest of the
household's life, this income will provide only approximately $5,000 per year in
retirement-nowhere near what the household is likely to need." Keith Miller, et
al., The Reality of the Retirement Crisis, Center for American Progress (Jan. 26,
2015),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2015/01/26/105394
/the-reality-of-the-retirement-crisis/
80
. "Social Security is the most important source of income for seniors,” Monique
Morrissey, The State of American Retirement: How 401(k)s have failed most
American workers, Economic Policy Institute (Mar. 3, 2016), Figure 22,
https://www.epi.org/publication/retirement-in-america/.
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use some of their FICA savings to offset the adverse impact on their
employees’ retirement benefits.
Even if take-home pay increases, other situations might exist in which
reduced wages could have collateral effects. These could include
applying for a loan or credit, negotiating alimony or child support, or
negotiating debt repayments, and the like. Some of these situations
may already focus on take-home pay; others may focus on gross salary.
In some of these situations reduced wages might be favored by the
employee; in other situations, increased take-home pay might be
favored. Over time, the relevant decision-makers may come to focus on
take-home pay rather than wages.
Another collateral effect is that existing or potential employees of a
multistate corporation might have difficulty understanding why two
similarly classified jobs carry a different salary depending on whether
they are in Connecticut or a neighboring state. Someone being
recruited might not understand why the starting salary in a neighboring
state is higher than the identical job in Connecticut. Again, this
difference can be explained if given the chance. But a potential
employee perusing the internet might dismiss the posted Connecticut
job opening long before the difference can be unbundled.
Large HR departments should be used to recruiting potential
employees with spread sheets showing things like cost of living, taxes,
crime, quality of schools, recreational activities, and everything else
that may be of interest to a possible hire. The payroll tax and its effect
on take-home pay would become just another line item in the
presentation.
Many corporations, and certainly the larger ones, use a well-known
third party to manage their payroll function. That party can easily
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provide spread sheets on the take-home pay on various salary levels in
various states.
4. Employer Perceptions
Despite the name “payroll tax,” employers that can reduce wages to
fully offset the cost of the tax could realize significant reductions in FICA
taxes. For them, the so-called payroll tax is anything but a tax. Savings
might also accrue from reduced contributions to deferred
compensation arrangements, health plans, and the like, because these
are usually tied to wages. Some employers, however, may hold
employees harmless from these reduced contributions by using some
of their FICA savings to maintain pre-payroll tax levels of contributions
or by adjusting retirement benefits.
VI. It is Uncertain Whether the Payroll Tax will Trigger the Retaliatory
Tax Paid by Connecticut Insurers to other States in which they are
Doing Business81
The retaliatory tax is unique to the insurance industry. The primary goal
of the retaliatory tax is to promote uniform and moderate rates of
taxation of the insurance industry throughout the country. The
retaliatory tax seeks to achieve a level playing field for out-of-state and
domestic insurance companies. The retaliatory tax was based on a
model statute promulgated by the insurance industry.82

In the interests of disclosure, I represented American Fire and Casualty in its
successful challenge to an aspect of New Jersey’s retaliatory statute. American
Fire and Cas. Co. v. New Jersey Div. of Taxation, 189 N.J. 65 (2006).
82
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization of California, 451
U.S. 648, 669.
81
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To illustrate the working of the retaliatory tax in a straightforward
simple situation, assume that most states have a 2% premium tax, but
State A has a 3% premium tax. Suppose an insurance company
incorporated in State A does business in State B, which has a 2%
premium tax. Because the premium tax in State A is one point higher
than the premium tax in State B, the State A insurance company will be
subject to a retaliatory tax of one point. That tax will be in addition to
State B’s premium tax of 2%, bringing the total premium tax on the
State A insurance company to 3%, rather than 2%.
The expectation, well supported by experience, is that State A
insurance companies will lobby their home state to lower their
premium tax rates and thus reduce or eliminate the retaliatory taxes
imposed by other states. When State A lowers its rate of premium tax,
State A insurance companies will have their retaliatory taxes reduced
elsewhere or perhaps eliminated, making them more competitive. And
insurance companies from other states with say 3% premium taxes
doing business in State A might now become subject for the first time
to A’s retaliatory tax, causing them to lobby their home states to
reduce their rates. The retaliatory tax is working as the industry and
state legislatures intended when a rate cut in one state is matched with
rate cuts around the country. This goal has been generally achieved.
The retaliatory tax is blatantly discriminatory. Typically, there are three
provisions of the U.S. Constitution under which a discriminatory
provision would be challenged. The first is the Commerce Clause, which
is inapplicable to the business of insurance because of the McCarran
Ferguson Act.83 The second is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Art. IV, §2, of the U.S. Constitution, which is inapplicable to
corporations and thus has no application to retaliatory taxes. The final
83

15 U.S.C.S. § 1011 et seq.
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provision is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires only that the
discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a
rational basis.
In a case challenging California’s retaliatory tax, the Court broke the
equal protection analysis into two parts: (1) Does the challenged
legislation have a legitimate purpose, and (2) Was it reasonable for the
lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would
promote that purpose?84
The Court answered these questions in the affirmative and upheld the
California retaliatory tax. “The legislative purpose of California’s
retaliatory tax is not difficult to discern, for such taxes have been a
common feature of insurance taxation for over a century. Although
variously expressed, the principal purpose of retaliatory tax laws is to
promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other
States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes.”85
The critical question is whether other states would interpret their
retaliatory taxes as covering payroll taxes? Resolving this issue is critical
to the industry. No other state has a mandatory payroll tax.86 If the
Connecticut payroll tax is retaliated against, the cost of writing
insurance in another state could increase, perhaps significantly.
Connecticut insurance companies would not be competing on a level
playing field in any state that retaliated for the payroll tax.

Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 668.
Id.
86 New York has an elective payroll tax. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
84
85
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To illustrate the issue, a sampling of some retaliatory statutes follows.87
They have been paraphrased to be more readable and to cover the
situation of a Connecticut insurer doing business in another state.
• Wisconsin: If Connecticut requires Wisconsin domestics to pay
taxes greater in the aggregate than Wisconsin charges
Connecticut domestics, retaliation occurs. Taxes are defined as
general purpose revenue taxes.88
• New Jersey: Taxes, fees, penalties, licenses, deposit requirement
or other obligations imposed by Connecticut upon New Jersey
insurers which are in excess of such items imposed by New Jersey
upon New Jersey insurers will result in retaliatory taxes.89
• New York: If insurers domiciled in New York are required by
Connecticut to pay taxes, fines, penalties, fees, or any other sum
greater than those required of Connecticut insurers by New York,
retaliation will occur.90
• Arizona: If Connecticut premium or income or other taxes, or any
fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or other
material obligations are, in the aggregate, in excess of those
Arizona applies to Connecticut insurers, a retaliatory amount is
due. [Special carve outs apply to personal income taxes, property
taxes, and special assessments.]91
• California: If any taxes, licenses, and fees, in the aggregate
imposed by Connecticut on California insurers, are in excess of the
Research into the actual forms used by other states to calculate and collect the
retaliatory tax was hampered because approximately 20% of the states require
only on-line filing, and an account is necessary to access the retaliatory tax forms.
88
WI. Stat. Sec. 76.66.
89
N.J. Stat. 17B:23-5 (life insurers).
90
N.Y. Ins. Law Section 1112.
91 Ariz. Stat. Sec. 20-230.
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amounts charged by California on Connecticut insurers a
retaliatory tax shall be imposed [Special carve outs apply to
property taxes.]92
• Florida: If Connecticut charges taxes, license, and fees in the
aggregate to Florida insurers that exceed those that Florida
imposes on Connecticut insurers retaliation will occur. [Special
carve outs apply to personal income taxes, sales or use taxes, and
property taxes.]93
• Pennsylvania: If Connecticut imposes taxes, fines, penalties,
licenses, fees, etc. on Pennsylvania insurers that are higher in the
aggregate than Pennsylvania would impose on Connecticut
insurers retaliation will occur.94
• Maine: If Connecticut imposes any taxes, licenses and other fees,
in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements
or other material requirements, obligations, prohibitions or
restrictions on Maine insurers that exceed what Maine would
impose on Connecticut insurers the same taxes, licenses and
Calif. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 28(f)(3), I.C. Sec. 685. In Western & Southern, supra
note 84, U.S. Supreme Court described retaliation as existing “when the insurer's
State of incorporation imposes higher taxes on California insurers doing business
in that State than California would otherwise impose on that State's insurers
doing business in California. In computing the retaliatory tax owed by a given outof-state insurer, California subtracts the California taxes otherwise due from the
total taxes that would be imposed on a hypothetical similar California company
doing business in the out-of-state insurer's State of incorporation. If the other
State's taxes on the hypothetical California insurer would be greater than
California's taxes on the other State's insurer, a retaliatory tax in the amount of
the difference is imposed. If the other State's taxes on the hypothetical California
insurer would be less than or equal to California's taxes, however, California
exacts no retaliatory tax from the other State's insurer.” 451 U.S. at 650.
93
FL. Sec. 624.5091, Rule 12B-8.016.
94 PA. Stat. 40-1-213; 40 P.S. Sec. 50.
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other fees, in the aggregate, or fines, penalties or deposit
requirements or other material requirements, obligations,
prohibitions or restrictions of whatever kind shall be imposed
upon Connecticut insurers. [Special carve outs apply to personal
income taxes, and property taxes.]95
Although these statutes are not identical, they follow the same general
pattern. They ask whether Connecticut’s taxes on a foreign insurance
company would exceed the foreign State’s taxes on a Connecticut
insurance company doing business in that other State. If so, retaliation
could be triggered. If Connecticut would impose a 5% payroll tax on
out-of-state insurance companies doing business in the State, and the
other State would not have a similar payroll tax, retaliation could occur.
But apparently in some cases the instructions or forms for calculating
the retaliatory tax cut back on the otherwise broad sweep of a state’s
retaliatory statute. In other words, in some situations the statutes have
more bark than bite.
For example, the instructions for the Arizona tax provide that insurers
from Connecticut are only required to use insurance tax rates,
assessments for health insurance pools, and application and admission
fees in calculating the retaliatory tax.96 The Arizona statute above, by
contrast, refers more broadly to “taxes.”
The California form for calculating the retaliatory tax uses only the tax
rate on gross premiums plus any fire department tax, fire marshal tax,
annual statement fee, certificate of authority fee, certification fee,

95
96

Me. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 428.
AZ Form E-RT and Arizona Retaliation Guide.
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agent license fee, ocean marine tax, franchise tax, and municipal tax.97
The statute is broader.
Despite the broad Maine statute above, the form for calculating the
retaliatory tax is limited to only the premium tax on different lines of
insurance.98
New Mexico provides an even more extreme example. Since 2009, the
Commissioner of Insurance has exercised his discretion not to enforce
the retaliatory tax.99
The forms will sometimes reflect the difficulty of taking certain taxes
into account in calculating the retaliatory tax even if the statute would
allow it. Property taxes are a nice illustration. In recognition of the
difficulty of including property taxes in the retaliatory calculation some
statutes carve them out from inclusion. But even where no carve out
occurs, as a matter of custom and tradition property taxes are often
excluded anyway.
Statutes, however, prevail over forms, which represent an executive
agency’s views and not those of a legislature. A decision by a current
administrator implemented through a form, which ignores the statute,
can be changed by his or her successor. New Mexico ‘s administrative
position of ignoring the State statute has already been criticized in a
special audit conducted by the New Mexico Office of the
Superintendent of Insurance.100

CA Form CDI FS-002.
ME Form INS-4.
99
New Mexico Bulletin 2009-008.
100
New Mexico Office of the Superintendent of Insurance, Special Audit of New
Mexico Premium Tax Filings for the Period January 1, 2003 Through December 31,
2016, p. 25.
97
98
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The majority of states have retaliatory statutes that are not limited or
narrowed by their forms or instructions. That leaves open the question
of how a retaliatory statute referring to “taxes” would be interpreted in
response to a payroll tax.
Connecticut has a retaliatory tax similar to these other states. The
Connecticut retaliatory tax compares “premium or income or other
taxes or any fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or
other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions” and retaliates if a
Connecticut insurer pays in another state more than an insurer from
that state would pay in Connecticut. A carve out is provided for
property taxes and personal income taxes.101
The question can be easily asked how Connecticut would apply its
retaliatory tax if the State had not enacted a payroll tax, but another
state had. Connecticut’s retaliatory tax is administered by the DRS and
not by the insurance department, unlike some other states. The
Commissioner of Taxation is an ex officio member of the Commission.
The question can be easily asked of the Commissioner, but the answer
will not necessarily have much probative value. Other states will not be
bound by what Connecticut would or would not do. Because a payroll
tax is unprecedented, the issue is one of first impression.
Unfortunately, the Commission needs to resolve this issue laboring
under incomplete information on retaliation.
Three approaches are conceivable. The least feasible of the three is for
the State to work through the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) to determine whether there would be
retaliation. The NAIC is the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory support
organization created and governed by the chief insurance regulators
101

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-211. The retaliatory tax form does not limit the statute.
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from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories.
Through the NAIC, state insurance regulators establish standards and
best practices. The NAIC, however, cannot legislate on behalf of a state;
it has only a hortatory role. It also meets only three times a year. There
would be no quick decision on the retaliation issue.
The second approach would be for Connecticut to exempt all insurance
companies, both domestic and foreign, from the payroll tax. This would
avoid the retaliatory tax. Presumably, employee wages would not be
reduced. If there were a tie-in, the employees would get no advantage
from the elimination of the 5% bracket, and no reduction in their
federal taxes. Similarly, the companies would get no reduction in the
FICA taxes they pay, or any reduction in payments to savings vehicles or
bonuses that are based on wages. If employees realized that they
would be better off if their employers paid the payroll tax and reduced
wages, they might lobby against an exemption for the companies.
If there were no tie-in so that employees would receive the benefit of
the elimination of the 5% rate, they would have no reason to oppose an
exemption for the industry. They would be in an optimal tax position,
receiving the benefits of the 5% bracket being eliminated with no
reduction in their wages.
The third approach would be for the State to impose the payroll tax on
only domestic Connecticut insurers. No retaliation would result. If there
were a tie-in, knowledgeable employees would support a reduction in
their wages because that would reduce their federal income taxes and
FICA taxes, and Connecticut income taxes from the elimination of the
5% bracket. The companies would have the benefit of a reduction in
the FICA taxes they pay, and a reduction in payments to savings
vehicles or bonuses that are based on wages. With no tie-in, employees
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would be expected to oppose any reduction in wages because they
would already be in an optimal tax position.
To be sure, while there would be no retaliation by other states under
this third approach, domestic insurers would pay a payroll tax that their
out-of-state competitors doing business in Connecticut would not pay.
That would increase their cost of doing business. If they could pass the
payroll tax onto their employees through a reduction in wages, they
would reduce the FICA taxes they would otherwise pay. If they did
reduce wages, their HR departments would have the same challenge
that other employers would have in competing for out-of-state talent,
convincing potential recruits that they will be better off with lower
salaries but higher take-home pay.102
After taking soundings from many connected with the industry, former
regulators, and tax specialists, I conclude that it is uncertain whether
the payroll tax will trigger retaliation as a practical matter. Certainly,
the retaliatory statues have broad enough language to cover a payroll
tax, but the question is whether as a practical matter they will be
interpreted to do so. More investigation is called for before this
uncertainty can be evaluated.
One final note. If the payroll tax were elective, companies for whom the
likelihood of retaliation would outweigh any savings in FICA taxes
would presumably not opt in. The problem of retaliation would be
eliminated. The question that would then arise is whether their
employees would get the benefits of the 5% rate being eliminated.

102

See Section V.3.
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VII. A Payroll Tax Cannot be Imposed on the Federal Government
Without its Permission
The federal government and its instrumentalities are immune from
state taxation. This hoary doctrine has its origins in the 1819 case of
McCulloch v. Maryland.103
That case involved a Maryland tax imposed on the Bank of the United
States, incorporated by an Act of Congress. No similar tax was imposed
on Maryland banks.
Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that the Maryland tax was
imposed on the operations of the Bank. Consequently, it was a “tax on
the operation of an instrument employed by the Government of the
Union to carry its powers into execution.”104 In hyperbolic dictum, the
Court warned that the “power to tax involves the power to destroy.”105
The Maryland tax was discriminatory because it applied only to the
federal bank and not to state banks. The case suggests that a nondiscriminatory tax might have been upheld. The opinion “does not
extend to . . . a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of
Maryland may hold in [the Bank], in common with other property of
the same description throughout the State."106
Unfortunately, McCulloch has not been limited to only discriminatory
taxes. Today, McCulloch is interpreted to prohibit even
nondiscriminatory state taxes on the federal government or its
instrumentalities.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Id. at 436-37.
105
Id. at 431.
106 Id. at 436.
103
104
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The modern statement of the rule is set forth in United States v. New
Mexico:107 “a State may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, lay a tax ‘directly upon the United States.’108 While
‘[one] could, and perhaps should, read M'Culloch . . . simply for the
principle that the Constitution prohibits a State from taxing
discriminatorily a federally established instrumentality,’109 the Court
has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from
state taxation. And after 160 years, the doctrine has gathered ‘a
momentum of authority that reflects, if not a detailed exposition of
considerations of policy demanded by our federal system, certainly a
deep instinct that there are such considerations . . . .’110” Id. at 733-34.
Indirect taxes on the federal government, however, are
constitutional.111 The Court drew a line between taxes that fell within
the general application of nondiscriminatory laws, such as a tax on a
government vendor, and a “direct burden . . . upon the governmental
instrumentality.”112 The Court stated that it was irrelevant whether the

United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943).
109
First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 350 (1968)
(dissenting opinion).
110 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 503-504 (1958) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
111 See, e.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), (holding that a
gross receipts tax on a government contractor is constitutional even if the tax
“may increase the cost to the government . . .”). Id. at 160.
112
Id. at 150. See also Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466
(1939)(upholding a New York income tax on an employee of the Federal Home
Owner’s Loan Association).
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108
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state income tax increased the cost of labor to the federal
government.113
The Court’s position is inconsistent with its willingness in other contexts
to substitute economic pragmatism for formalism.114 It is hard to
understand why certain nondiscriminatory taxes imposed on the
federal government should not be acceptable, such as a property tax or
a payroll tax. Nonetheless, a challenge to the Court’s doctrine that a tax
imposed directly on the federal government is unconstitutional would
be upheld by the lower courts and would require the U.S. Supreme
Court to intervene. It is an avenue not worth pursuing.
Although a payroll tax imposed on the federal government would be
unconstitutional notwithstanding that it would be nondiscriminatory,
the federal government would be free to waive its immunity and agree
to opt into the payroll tax regime. If it were to opt in and reduce wages,
the government would receive less federal income taxes and FICA
taxes, but would save from the reduction in wages and come out
ahead. However, because of civil service constraints and unions, wages
are unlikely to be reduced.115 This would be especially true if there
were no tie-in so that federal employees would already be in an
optimal tax situation by receiving the benefits inuring from the
elimination of the 5% bracket with no reduction in wages. From this
perspective, federal employees would be in the same situation as

See also the companion cases of Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941);
Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941), upholding sales and use taxes on
government vendors that passed these taxes forward to the federal government.
114
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
115
The Project estimates that federal employees represent about 1.1% of all
Connecticut employees. See supra note 42 at p. 11. The Consultant could
estimate the wages of this group.
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employees of a private-sector employer that paid the payroll tax but
could not shift it onto employees through wage reductions.
If the federal government did not agree to a payroll tax and if there
were a tie-in, its employees would not have the benefit of the
elimination of the 5% bracket.
If there were no explicit tie-in, the State could consider other means of
recapturing some or all of the benefits of the 5% bracket from federal
employees. In effect, this would impose an ad hoc tie-in. The risk with
an ad hoc tie-in is that federal employees could argue that they were
unconstitutionally discriminated against. If revenue considerations
justify it, the merits of this constitutional argument would need further
analysis.
If a tie-in were adopted across the board, covering all employees, and
the federal government refused to waive its immunity, the
constitutional argument would not arise
VIII. A Payroll Tax Cannot be Imposed on an Indian Tribe in its
Capacity as an Employer Without its Permission
States do not have the power to levy a tax directly on a tribe’s activities
on a reservation unless Congress or the tribe authorizes it. “[A]bsent
cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it . . . a state
is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.”116

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995)
(quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (citation omitted)).
116
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“In the special area of state taxation of Indian tribes . . . the [Court] has
adopted a per se rule” against state jurisdiction.117
Application of this per se or “categorical” rule depends on where the
legal incidence of the state tax falls.118 Thus, “[t]he initial and frequently
dispositive question in Indian tax cases . . . is who bears the legal
incidence of the tax.”119
According to the United States Supreme Court:
“If the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe . . . inside Indian
country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional
authorization.”120
The proposed payroll tax is levied on the employer. The legal incidence
of the tax is on the employer. Unless a tribe or Congress authorizes the
payroll tax, it cannot be imposed on a tribe in its capacity as employing
persons, whether Indians or not, on a reservation.
Furthermore, in the gaming context, the Tribal-State Compact between
the Mohegan Tribe and the State of Connecticut provides that
“Prohibition on taxation by the State. Nothing in this Compact shall be
deemed to authorize the State to impose any tax, fee, charge or
assessment upon the Tribe or any Tribal gaming operation except for
charges expressly authorized pursuant to section 11 of this Compact."
Id. Section 17(f). See also Proposal of the State of Connecticut for a
Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, Section
17(f).

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n. 17 (1987).
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458.
119
Id.
120 Id. at 459.
117
118

71

Like the federal government discussed above, a tribe can elect to waive
its immunity and opt into the payroll tax regime.
If no payroll tax is imposed on the tribe, their employees should not
have the benefit of the elimination of the 5% bracket. An ad hoc tie-in
could be adopted to deprive them of these benefits, as was discussed in
the case of federal employees. The question is whether that would
result in an unconstitutional discrimination against the tribe or its
Indian employees. If revenue considerations make it worthwhile, that
question would need to be pursued in greater depth.
Just like in the case of the federal government, if a tie-in existed across
the board, and a tribe refused to waive its immunity, the constitutional
issue would not arise.
IX. Should the Payroll Tax be Mandatory or Elective?
If the tax is mandatory, the question becomes how many employers
can shift the tax onto employees through reduced wages. If employers
could not reduce wages, then for them the payroll tax becomes a new
cost of doing business. For a labor-intensive, low-profit business, the
tax could be excessive. Would this add to the image of the State as
having a bad business climate, notwithstanding that Connecticut
employees would benefit from the reduction in the State personal
income tax if there were no tie-in? The question for economists is what
effect would a tax on Connecticut wages paid by an employer that
could not shift the tax to its employees, accompanied by a reduction in
the Connecticut personal income tax, have on the State’s economy? As
important as this question is, it may be essentially unknowable.
If the tax is mandatory and the employer can shift it to employees
through reduced wages, then the payroll tax will be working as
intended. The 5% payroll tax on Connecticut wages would then have
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the effect of substituting for a 5% tax on Connecticut wages. Both
employers and employees would come out ahead.
The ability to shift the tax onto employees could well change over time
as labor conditions change. Both employers and employees would need
assurance that the State would not adversely change key elements of
the payroll tax going forward. The history in Connecticut with increases
in rates once a tax is adopted does not necessarily offer this assurance.
Nor does the recent experience with the reduction in the credit in the
pass-through entity tax.
If the tax is mandatory with some employers being able to reduce
wages to shift the cost to employees, while others would be unable, the
tax would be a hybrid: neither fish nor fowl.
The Commission confronts a classic example of decision making in the
light of uncertainty. Little experience exists for predicting how an
employer would react to a 5% payroll tax. There is a worrisome
downside in being wrong, with the payroll tax then becoming a tax on
employers rather than a win-win proposition for employers and
employees, with the federal government being the loser.121
New York’s payroll tax is a cautionary tale. It is elective annually and
phased-in over three years. The low participation rate, 0.1% of
employers, is not encouraging. No major employer is participating,
including the State itself. The New York legislation is dissimilar from
what is being proposed in Connecticut so it is unclear what weight
should be given to that State’s low participation rate. More needs to be
learned about how New York rolled out its payroll tax and the public
relations and public education that accompanied it.

121

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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An elective payroll tax would avoid it becoming a tax borne by the
employer. Presumably, only those employers making the election
would be confident that they could shift the cost to their employees. If
that proved to be unrealistic, they would not have to continue the
election. Conversely, employers that initially thought they could not
shift the tax but later decided they could do so going forward, would
subsequently make the election.
Only employees of an employer making the election should qualify for
the rate reduction in the personal income tax. In a sense, the election
implicitly serves as a tie in. Employees of employers not making the
election would have no claim on receiving a windfall by benefiting from
the rate reduction in the States personal income tax. Presumably,
employees should support, if not lobby, for an election by their
employers as it would increase their take-home pay.
After sufficient experience was gained with the tax, the participation
rate could be evaluated, the revenue consequences determined, and
administrative and policy dilemmas identified. The Legislature could
then decide whether to make it permanent or continue the election. Of
course, in the short-term the anticipated revenue for the State would
have to be scaled back if it were elective unless the major employers in
Connecticut chose to participate.
X. Conclusion
Many issues that need to be resolved were raised in both the text and
in footnotes. The first part of this Conclusion gathers those issues with
advice in some cases on the next steps to take.
• The threshold question is how many employers will be able to
shift the payroll tax onto their employees? One view is that most
employers will be unable to shift the tax. In that case, it becomes
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a new 5% tax on employment, coupled with a reduction in State
income tax rates. This shift in tax from employees to employers
should be debated explicitly and not implemented in the guise of
an ineffective payroll tax.
• The opposing view is that employers typically can reduce their
costs of doing business. As evidence, economists note that wages
have not increased as much as some thought they should have
given the low rate of unemployment. Employers have reduced
costs of health care by increasing co-pays on employee insurance
plans and imposing other constraints on coverage. Those who
subscribe to this view will have faith that the cost of the payroll
tax will be passed onto employees.
• Should the State provide a tie-in, that is, should the benefits of
reducing State income tax rates be extended only to employees
whose employers were able to reduce wages? This approach
would minimize the State’s costs and provide a way of dealing
with the knotty issues presented by State, federal, and tribal
employees. But could a tie-in be administered? The DRS needs to
be consulted on this issue.
• Should the benefits of a reduction in the State personal income
tax extend to all wages, only Connecticut wages, or only
Connecticut wages that were reduced to accommodate the
payroll tax? The correct policy answer would seem to be to limit
these benefits to only those wages that were reduced because
the employer shifted the payroll tax to the employee. This tie-in
might be difficult to enforce without some attestation and proof
from the employer or employees. The DRS should be consulted on
how to audit this issue. The tie-in solves many knotty problems
and deserves a thorough vetting.
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• If a tie-in is not feasible, the next possible approach would be to
grant the benefits from reducing the State income tax to only
wages that were subject to the payroll tax, whether they were
reduced or not. An employer paying Connecticut residents
working outside the State would not have those wages taxed
under the payroll tax. Yet if those residents cannot benefit from
the reduction in State income taxes, the result could be that outof-state wages would be taxed at a higher rate than Connecticut
wages in those instances where income tax rates outside of
Connecticut are lower, such as New Hampshire. This raises a
possible constitutional issue of discriminating against interstate
commerce. If little revenue were lost from allowing all wages to
benefit from the reduction in personal income taxes, that would
be the cautious approach to take. If, however, the loss was
significant, the constitutional issue would merit a deeper analysis.
A tie-in would likely blunt this potential constitutional attack..
• Non-wage income such as dividends, capital gains, interest, rent
and the like should not benefit from the reduction in tax rates.
The existing rate schedule (or a new one) should be applied to
non-wage income.
• The possibility of three tax schedules exists; one for non-wage
income, one for wages that were reduced by the amount of the
payroll tax, and one for wages that were not reduced. Each
schedule introduces an element of complexity.
• In applying the existing rates on non-wage income, should the
amount of an individual’s wages be considered? In other words,
should persons with high wages pay at a higher rate on their nonwage income than those with the same amount of non-wage
income but having much lower wages?
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• The refundable low-income tax credit raises the possibility of
fraudulent returns. DRS needs to determine this risk and how to
minimize it.
• The possibility of retaliation by other states to Connecticut
insurance companies in response to the payroll tax needs to be
evaluated very carefully.
• What is the revenue at stake from not being able to tax the
employees of the federal government and of the Indian tribes?
• There is nothing sacrosanct about the 5% rate of payroll tax
despite it being identical to the rate of New York’s elective payroll
tax. Hundreds of rates and rate schedules are possible, as are
combinations of exemptions and recapture rules. All of this needs
to be simulated.
• Should the payroll tax should be elective or mandatory, and if
elective should it be phased-in? An election helps sort out those
employers that can reduce wages from all others. A phase-in
allows the State to gain needed experience with the tax.
• If elective, should the employees of an employer opting out
nonetheless receive the benefits of the reduction in rates? A tie-in
would automatically answer this question by denying the benefits
to employees of employers that opted out.
• The New York experience with its elective payroll tax needs to be
thoroughly investigated. Why has there been such a low rate of
participation? What can the Commission learn from the way New
York rolled out that tax? What was the public outreach like? What
kinds of public education and awareness took place? How
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probative is New York’s experience? Not enough information is
known about the New York experience at this time.
• Another aspect of the New York approach needs to be explored in
depth. New York grants a credit to the employee for the payroll
tax paid by the employer. It does not reduce any of the rates in its
personal income tax. The advantages and disadvantages of this
approach need to be compared with our proposed payroll tax.
• Hiring a consultant should be a priority to answer the above
questions and those raised in PA 19-117, Sec. 385, establishing
the Commission.
If the Legislature decides to move forward with the payroll tax, it needs
to control the narrative and should consider using a different name for
the tax. To start with, the name “payroll tax” is inaccurate and has the
wrong optics for an approach that is intended to reduce the State and
federal taxes on both employers and employees. If it works as
intended, with employers passing the tax onto employees through
reduced wages, it is not a tax at all, but a way of increasing the takehome pay of Connecticut employees by reducing their State and federal
income tax and by reducing the FICA taxes paid by them and their
employers.
Notably, New York adopted a fairly clumsy name for its payroll tax,
“Employer Compensation Expense Program. This name is both
ambiguous and not very informative, but if anything, it sounds positive.
Employers are not being taxed; they are being compensated for some
unspecified “expense.”
Adopting a new tax is always challenging. As those of us who worked on
the original Connecticut income tax can attest, unanticipated issues will
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always come up in the drafting. And that was true despite many other
states having had long experience with an income tax upon which we
could draw. In the case of a payroll tax, by contrast, Connecticut has
only New York to look to, and its approach is different from what is
being proposed here.
The drafting challenges are daunting, but the Legislature is lucky to
have superb and experienced personnel. The executive branch also has
a wonderful resource in the DRS and the OPM. In addition, Connecticut
is fortunate to have a very talented group of tax lawyers in the private
sector, who have always given unselfishly of their time. Finally, the
School and State Finance Project has spent more time working on a
payroll tax than any other group. A joint venture among all of these
groups would be invaluable in the drafting of a bill.

79

Richard D. Pomp
Richard D. Pomp is the Alva P. Loiselle Professor of Law at the
University of Connecticut Law School. He is a summa cum laude
graduate of the University of Michigan and a magna cum laude
graduate of Harvard Law School. He has taught at Harvard, New York
University, Columbia, University of Texas, and Boston College. In
addition, he has been a Distinguished Professor in Residence,
Chulalongkorn Law School, Bangkok, Thailand, and a Visiting Scholar at
the University of Tokyo Law School and at Harvard Law School.
Professor Pomp has been admitted as an expert witness in more than
30 states and the federal district courts and has appeared in more than
120 cases. He serves as counsel and a litigation consultant to law firms,
corporations, accounting firms, and state tax administrations. He has
participated in various capacities in Supreme Court litigation.
Professor Pomp has also served as a consultant to cities, states, the
Multistate Tax Commission, the Navajo Nation, the U.S. Congress, the
U.S. Treasury, the Department of Justice, the IRS, the United Nations,
the IMF, the World Bank, and numerous foreign countries, including the
People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, Indonesia, the
Gambia, Zambia, Mexico, the Philippines, Pakistan, India, and Vietnam.
He is the former Director of the New York Tax Study Commission.
Under his tenure, New York restructured its personal and corporate
income taxes, and created an independent tax court.
Professor Pomp's casebook, State and Local Taxation, now in its 9th
edition, has been used in more than 100 schools, state tax
administrations, and major accounting firms for their internal training.
Portions of the casebook have been translated into Chinese, Dutch,
German, Japanese, Spanish, and Vietnamese. He is also the author of
more than 130 articles, numerous chapters in books, and various books
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and monographs. His writings have appeared in The New York Times,
The Wall Street Journal, and the Financial Times.
In addition to the local and regional media, Professor Pomp has been
interviewed by CNN, NPR, Time Magazine, Bloomberg Radio, Sirius
Radio, KCBS, WINA, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The
Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times,
the Minneapolis Star Tribune, the Sacramento Bee, The Baltimore Sun
and The International Herald Tribune.
In 2007, he received the NYU Institute on State and Local Taxation
Award for Outstanding Achievement in State and Local Taxation. In
2011, he was awarded the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) Lifetime
Achievement Award. He was the 2012 winner of the University of
Connecticut’s Faculty Excellence in Teaching - Graduate Level. Tax
Analysts selected him as its 2013 State Tax Lawyer and Academic of the
Year. In 2014, he received the Council on State Taxation’s Excellence in
State Taxation Award. The Connecticut Law Tribune selected him for a
2015 Professional Excellence Award. He recently won the Perry Zirkel
'76 Distinguished Teaching Award.
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J.D. 1972 magna cum laude
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RECENT PRIZES AND AWARDS
Perry Zirkel '76 Distinguished Teaching Award, 2017.
Recipient of a Fulbright Award, 2015.
Connecticut Law Tribune, 2015 Professional Excellence Award.
2014 Council on State Taxation (COST), Excellence in State Taxation Award.
2013 State Tax Person of the Year, Tax Analysts.
2012 University of Connecticut’s Faculty Excellence in Teaching---Graduate Level.
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), Distinguished Service in State and Local Tax Law
(2011).
All Decade State Tax Team, State Tax Notes, 2010.
NYU Institute on State and Local Taxation, Outstanding Achievement in State and Local
Taxation (2008).
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Consultant, Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, 2019-present.
Consultant, Washington Commissioner of Insurance, 2019-present.
Consultant, Washington Attorney General, 2016-2018.
Consultant, City of Kansas City, Missouri, 2015-2016.
Hearing Officer, Multistate Tax Commission, 2013.
BNA Tax Advisory Board, 2011-present.
Member, California Commission on the 21st Century Economy, 2009-2010.
Co-Reporter for the Revision of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA), 2008-2009.
Advisory Board, State Sales Tax Alert, 2008-2010.
Member, Connecticut Streamlined Sales Tax Commission, 2007-2008.
Advisory Board, Pew Charitable Foundation Tax Project, 2007-2008.
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General Editor, Lexis Connecticut Practice Insights, 2006-present.
Member, Connecticut Business Tax Credit and Tax Policy Review Committee, 2005.
Consultant, State of Delaware, 2002.
Consultant, South Carolina Department of Revenue, 2002-2003, 2005-2006.
Consultant, Treasurer, State of New Jersey, 2002-2003.
Consultant, City of San Francisco, 2001-2003.
CCH, State Tax Advisory Board, 2000-2011.
Advisory Board, Interstate Tax Report, 2000-2010.
BNA Tax Management State Tax Advisory Board, 2000-present.
Consultant, California Legislature, 2000.
Consultant, State of West Virginia, 2000.
Consultant, California Franchise Tax Board, 2000.
Consultant, Alaska Department of Revenue, 1999-2010.
Consultant, New York Department of Taxation and Finance, 1998-1999.
Consultant, Pew Charitable Foundation, 1998-2000.
Consultant, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1997-2000.
Consultant, Tennessee Attorney General, 1998-1999, 2001-2003.
Consultant, Montana Department of Revenue, 1998-1999, 2004-2008, 2016.
Consultant, U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, 2001.
Advisory Board, Deloitte & Touche Center for Multistate Taxation at University of
Wisconsin, 1997-2014.
Consultant, Louisiana Department of Revenue, 1995-2000.
Consultant, Utah Attorney General, 1994-1995.
Property Revaluation Task Force, Connecticut Institute of Municipal Studies, 1993.
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Consultant, IMF, 1993, 1999.
Consultant, Multistate Tax Commission, 1993, 1996-2004, 2009-2010, 2014, 2016.
Consultant, Illinois Department of Revenue, 1993.
Consultant, North Dakota Department of Revenue, 1992-1993, 1999-2005.
Consultant, IRS, 1992-94.
Editorial Advisory Board, State Income Tax Alert, 1992-present.
Book Review Editor, State Tax Notes, 1992-1994.
Columnist, Natural Resources Tax Review, 1992-1993.
Member, Blue Ribbon Committee on Municipal Overburden for the City of Hartford,
1991.
Advisory Board, State Tax Notes, 1991-present.
Consultant, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 1991, 2002-2004.
Advisory Board, Center for State and Local Taxation, 1990-present.
Short Review Editor, Tax Notes International, 1989-1994.
Member, Connecticut Task Force to Study and Evaluate State Tax Revenue and the
Current Tax Base, 1989-1991.
Special Counsel, Connecticut Senate Majority Leader, 1989, 1991.
Consultant, Ministries of Justice and Finance, The Gambia, 1989 (HIID).
Member, Consulting Group on Tax Policy and its Impact on Land Use, Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy, 1988-present.
Consultant, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, 1988-1989 (HIID).
Instructor, NYU-IRS Continuing Legal Education Program, 1988, 1989, 1991.
Educational Leader, Soviet-American Legal Tour, 1987.
Consultant, Connecticut Conference of Municipalities, 1987, 1989, 1991.
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Consultant, Citizens for Tax Justice, 1981.
Consultant, Appalachian Research and Defense Fund, 1981.
Referee, National Tax Journal, 1980-2005.
Consultant, World Bank, 1980.
Chairman of the Board, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 1979-2016.
Consultant, People's Republic of China, 1979-1982, 1987.
Advisory Committee, Assessment and Valuation Legal Reporter, 1979-1993.
Consultant, City of Hartford, 1978-1980.
Consultant, Connecticut Department of Education, 1978-1979.
Consultant, Hartford Chamber of Commerce, 1978-1979.
Consultant, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1977-1978.
Consultant, Navajo Nation, 1977-82.
Consultant, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1977.
Consultant, Ministry of Finance, Mexico, 1977.
Consultant, Commissioner of Taxation, Republic of Zambia, 1976-1978.
Consultant, United Nations Development Program, 1975.
Editor, European Taxation, and Research Associate, International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation, the Netherlands, 1972-1973.
Commissioned Officer, U.S. Public Health Service, 1968-1970.
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PUBLICATIONS
BOOKS, REPORTS, AND MONOGRAPHS
MYTH VS. REALITY: AIRBNB & ITS VOLUNTARY TAX COLLECTION EFFORTS (2019).
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION (NINTH EDITION, 2019) (EARLIER EDITIONS OMITTED).
2017 CCH GUIDEBOOK TO CONNECTICUT TAXES (ED.) (EARLIER EDITIONS OMITTED).
MODERNIZING THE STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: MARKET-BASED APPORTIONMENT
FOR CONTENT PROVIDERS (MOTION PICTURES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (2015)).
REPORT OF THE HEARING OFFICER, MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT ARTICLE IV [UDITPA]
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS (2014).
STATE TAXATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS, THE TRIBES AND THOSE DOING BUSINESS WITH
THEM: SOVEREIGNTY, INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE, TREATIES AND STATUTES
(BNA, 2014).
TAXING SMARTER AND FAIRER: PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY IN THE CONNECTICUT TAX STRUCTURE (2005).
TAX PREFERENCES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: OIL & GAS, COAL, NONFUEL MINERALS,
TIMBER, AND FISHING (2000) (WITH M. MCINTYRE).
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: TAXATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1999) (with J. Li et al).
CORPORATE TAX POLICY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: IMPROVING STATE TAX
POLICYMAKING BY ENHANCING LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC ACCESS (1993).
THE REVERSE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF
COMPENSATION, TAXATION AND RELATED POLICY MEASURES (1977) (with O.
Oldman).
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ARTICLES
Myth v. Reality: Airbnb & its Voluntary Tax Collection Efforts, 93 State Tax Notes 187
(2019).
Did South Dakota Make a Strategic Error in Drafting its Wayfair Statute?, 37 J. of State
Tax. 29 (2019).
The Disclosure of Individual Tax Returns: A Historical Overview, 92 State Tax Notes
1120 (2019).
Remote Foreign Vendors: The Only Thing to Fear is Fear Itself, 37 J. State Tax. 31
(2019).
GILTI or Not Guilty, 91 State Tax Notes 950 (2019).
Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities, 58 Wash U.J. & Policy 1
(Symposium Issue) (2019).
Wayfair and the Myth of Substantial Nexus, 36 J. State Tax. 21 (2018).
Interring Substantial Nexus—A Missed Opportunity, 89 State Tax Notes 858 (2018).
Inroads, Narrowings, and Restrictions, 90 State Tax Notes 1029 (2018).
Looking Forward and Backward, 86 State Tax Notes 1150 (2017).
Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 Am. U. L. Rev. 1115 (Symposium
Issue) (2016).
Los Principios y Metodos Estatales de la Tributacion Multi-Jurisdicccional, 8 Quaestiol
Iuris 1125 (2015) (with Rodriguez).
The Apportionment of Income: Reflections on the Multistate Tax Commission’s (MTC)
Proposals to Revise the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA), National Tax Association, 107th Annual Proceedings (2014).
Apportionment Formula: Economische Unie en de Verdeling Van Inkomen, 24 Forfaitair,
19 (2011) (with Vlassaker).
The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 Tax
Lawyer 902 (2010).
Die Gemeiname Konsolidierte Körperschaftsteuer-Bemessungsgrundlage: (R) Evolution
der Konzernbesteuerung?, Internationales Steurrecht (2008) (with Gersten).
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A Policy Analysis of Michigan’s Mislabeled Gross Receipts Tax, 53 Wayne Law Review
1283 (2008) (symposium issue with McIntyre); excerpted as Michigan’s New
Apportioned Value Added Tax, 51 State Tax Notes 673 (2009).

La Tributacion Multiestatal de Sociedades en Estados Unidos, 122 Cronica Tributaria
137 (2007) (with Maya).
Sales Tax in the United States—Theory and Practice, 7 European Law Review 81 (2006)
(with Gradzki).
Formulary Apportionment in the United States: The System and the Cases, 56 Japan
Taxation 77 (2005) (with Sho Hiraki).
State Tax Reform: Proposals for Wisconsin, 88 Marquette Law Review 45 (2004)
(invitational symposium issue).
Show Me the Point! A Response to ‘Show Me the Money,’ 31 State Tax Notes 1095
(2004).
The Collision Between Nonprofits and the Cities Over the Property Tax: Possible
Solutions, in Property Tax Exemptions for Charities: Mapping the Battlefield (E.
Brody ed. 2002).
The Constitutionality of Michigan’s Capital Asset Deduction, New York University
Institute on State and Local Taxation 2001 (with Van Tifflin et al).
Designing a Combined Reporting Regime for a State Corporate Income Tax: A Case
Study of Louisiana, 61 Louisiana Law Review 699 (2001) (invitational
symposium issue, 2001) (with McIntyre and Mines).
Ruminations on Reforming Aspects of Connecticut’s Tax Structure, 41 State Tax Notes
647 (2006).
A Brief History of the Electric Utility Industry, in IMPACTS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY
DEREGULATION ON PROPERTY TAXATION (2000).
The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections (And Confessions) of a Tax
Lawyer, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION (D. Brunori, ed. 1998); reprinted in
16 State Tax Notes 939 (1999).
Post-Marriage Income Splitting Through the Deduction for Alimony Payments: A Reply
to Professor Schoettle on Lunding v. N.Y., 13 State Tax Notes 1631 (1997) (with
M. McIntyre).
State Income Tax Treatment of Residents and Nonresidents Under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 13 State Tax Notes 245 (1997) (with M. McIntyre).
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Adrift Without a Rudder — A Response to Seaman Miethke, 11 State Tax Notes 487
(1996) (with M. McIntyre).
State Taxation of Mail-Order Sales of Computers after Quill: An Evaluation of MTC
Bulletin 95-1, 11 State Tax Notes 177 (1996) (with M. McIntyre).
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 Tax Law Rev.
47 (1995) (with W. Hellerstein and M. McIntyre).
The Political Economy of Tax Return Privacy--Revisited, 8 State Tax Notes 2389 (1995).
Issues in the Design of Formulary Apportionment in the Context of NAFTA, 49 Tax Law
Rev. 795 (1995).
GATT, Barclays, and Double Taxation, 8 State Tax Notes 977 (1995) (with M.
McIntyre); a revision of Double Trouble: Double Taxation Aspects of Formulary
Apportionment in the International Context, Proceedings of the 86th Annual
Conference, National Tax Association 236 (Stocker ed. 1994).
Openness and Accountability in State Tax Policymaking, Proceedings of the 86th
National Tax Association 83 (Stocker ed. 1994).
Turning the Clock Back to the Future: The Disclosure of State Corporate Tax
Information, 22 Capital Law Review 373 (1993) (Symposium Issue); reprinted in
6 State Tax Notes 603 (1994).
Rethinking State Tax Expenditure Budgets, in 5 J. of Public Budgeting and Financial
Manag. 337 (1993), a revision of State Tax Expenditure Budgets--And Beyond, in
THE UNFINISHED AGENDA FOR STATE TAX REFORM, 65 (S. Gold ed. 1988);
excerpted in Proceedings of the 81st Annual Conference, National Tax
Association--Tax Institute of America 33 (Stocker ed. 1989).
The Tax Treatment of Condemnations, in AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1993); a
revision of The Tax Treatment of Condemnations and Other Involuntary
Conversions, in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (1991).
Are the Standards for Tax Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction Identical?, 54 Tax
Notes 333 (1992); 2 State Tax Notes 86 (1992).
Determining the Boundaries of a Post Bellas Hess World, 44 Nat. Tax J. 237 (1991),
reprinted in 1 State Tax Notes 397 (1991); excerpted in 1 Sales and Use Tax Alert
5 (1992).
A Normative Inquiry into the Base of a Retail Sales Tax, 43 Nat. Tax J. 427 (1990) (with
Oldman), reprinted in 1 State Tax Notes 170 (1991).
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Taxation in China, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA (W. Streng and A. Wilcox eds., 1990)
(with T. Gelatt).
The Like Kind Exchange of Real Property, in AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1991);
a revision of Nontaxable Exchanges of Real Property, in POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY (1990).
The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing its Nonresident Citizens, in INCOME
TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL MOBILITY (J. Bhagwati ed. 1989); a
revision of The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing Nonresident Citizens, 17
NYU J. Int'l Law and Politics 245 (1985).
Restructuring a State Income Tax in Response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 36 Tax
Notes 1195 (1987); a revision of Simplicity and Complexity in the Context of a
State Tax System, in REFORMING STATE TAX SYSTEMS (S. Gold ed. 1986);
reprinted in Proceedings of the 80th Annual Conference, National Tax
Association--Tax Institute of America 28 (Stocker ed. 1987); ISSUES IN STATE
TAXATION (California Tax Policy Conference, 1987).
Reforming a State Corporate Income Tax, 51 Alb. L. Rev. 383 (1987) (Symposium
Issue).
State Corporate Income Taxes: The Illogical Deduction for Income Taxes Paid to Other
States, 42 Tax Law Rev. 419 (1987); reprinted in Multistate Tax Commission
Review (September 1987).
The Use and Misuse of Interstate Tax Comparisons, 5 J. of State Tax'n 97 (1986);
reprinted in 33 Tax Notes 87 (1986).
An Evaluation of New York's Sales Tax Audit Program, 5 J. of State Tax'n 3 (1986) (with
J. Barrese); reprinted in 8 Municipal Finance J. 151 (1987).
Fairness and Function in the New York Tax Appeals System: Proposals for Reform, 49
Alb. L. Rev. 352 (1985) (with R. Plattner and R. Kay).
The Role of State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Business, 29 Tax Notes 521
(1985); reprinted in Multistate Tax Commission Review (1985); Colorado
Municipalities (March-April 1986); New York Economic Development Working
Papers #4 (Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1987); excerpted in 13 People
and Taxes (Sept. 1985).
State Tax Reform New York Style, in Proceedings of the 77th Annual Conference,
National Tax Association--Tax Institute of America 192 (Bowers ed. 1985);
reprinted in S. GOLD, STATE TAX STUDY COMMISSION: AN OVERVIEW OF FOUR
APPROACHES (NCSL, 1985).
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Tax Aspects of Doing Business with the People's Republic of China, 22 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 421 (1984) (with T. Gelatt); reprinted in CHINA'S LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT (J. Oldham ed. 1986); a substantial revision of China's Tax
System: An Overview and Transactional Analysis in FOREIGN TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 36 (M. Moser ed.
1st edition 1984), revised and reprinted in 2d ed. 1987 at 42; revised and reprinted
in 3rd ed.
State Tax Reform for the Eighties, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 925 (1984) (festschrift issue);
reprinted in Multistate Tax Commission Review (Oct. 1984); a revision of
Improving a State's Tax System and its Administration Through a Major Tax
Study, Revenue Administration--1983, p. 56 (1983).
Federal Tax Concepts as a Guide for State Apportionment of Dividends: Life After
ASARCO, XVIII Tax Notes 411 (1982) (with R. Rudnick).
The Evolving Tax System of the People's Republic of China, 16 Tex. Int'l L.J. 11 (1981)
(with S. Surrey and T. Gelatt); excerpted in LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 495 (R. Folsom and J. Minan eds. 1986).
What is Happening to the Property Tax?, 7 J. Real Est. Tax'n 359 (1980); reprinted in 15
Assessors J. 107 (1980); and in Proceedings of the 72nd Annual Conference,
National Tax Association--Tax Institute of America 10 (Bowers ed. 1980).
The Unitary Method: Thirteen Questions and Answers, X Tax Notes 891 (1980) (with
Sen. F. Church); reprinted in Selected Reading on Tax Policy: 25 Years of Tax
Notes.
The Tax Structure of the People's Republic of China, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (1979) (with S.
Surrey), a substantial revision of Taxation in the People's Republic of China, in A
NEW LOOK AT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 351 (H.
Holtzmann and W. Surrey eds. 1979).
The Deduction of Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest: A Tax Expenditure Analysis, 1
Can. Tax'n 23 (1979).
Tax Measures in Response to the Brain Drain, 20 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (1979) (with O.
Oldman).
Lifestyles and Land Use: Providing Financial Assistance Through the Tax System, in
LAND USE AND LIFESTYLES 47 (1979).
Tax-Exempt Property and the Cities: Striking a Balance, 7 J. Real Est. Tax'n 50 (1979), a
revision of Testimony Before the State Finance Committee's Subcommittee on
Tax-Exempt Property, in PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR NON-PROFIT
INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS 1 (1978), excerpted as Some Pay . . .
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Some Don't: Evaluating Property Tax Exemptions, 6 People and Taxes 4 (1978);
reprinted in STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVOLT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE 80'S at
178 (D. Tipps and L. Webb, eds. 1980).
The Brain Drain: A Tax Analysis of the Bhagwati Proposal, 3 World Dev. 751 (1975)
(with O. Oldman), reprinted in TAXING THE BRAIN DRAIN: A PROPOSAL (J.
Bhagwati and M. Partington eds. 1976).
SUPREME COURT AMICUS BRIEFS
Brief of Tax Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner in Loudoun County,
Virginia v. Dulles Duty Free, LLC (2018).
Brief of Amici Curiae Tax Law Professors and Economists in Support of Petitioner in
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (2017).
Brief of Interested Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Brohl v.
Direct Marketing Association, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
Brief of Amici Curiae Fiscal Policy Institute, Connecticut Voices for Children and Good
Jobs First in Support of Respondents in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332 (2006).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission in Support of Respondent in General
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997)
MISCELLANEOUS
Peter Faber, the Proverbial Lawyer's Intellectual and Intellectual Lawyer, 90 State
Tax Notes 1051 (2019).
With Billions in 'Tax Expenditures,' Legislature Ignores Spending Cap, CT Mirror,
December 22, 2011.
Malloy's Corporate Bets On ESPN And The 'First Five', Hartford Courant, August 1,
2011.
Huge Tax Grab Targeting Millstone Bad For Consumers, Business, Hartford Courant,
April 24, 2011.
In Memoriam: Oliver Oldman, 122 Harv. Law. Rev. 1285 (2009).
Sales Taxes in the United States—Historical Development and Policy Analysis, 5 Warsaw
University Law Review 86 (2006) (with M. Gradzki).
THE ESCHEAT OF GIFT CERTIFICATES: POLICY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
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(2005) (with R. Kay).
Revise the Property-Tax Exemption, The Chronicle of Philanthropy, May 2, 2002.
This Corporate Tax Break Will Cost Us Jobs, Hartford Courant, April 27, 2000 (with M.
Mazerov).
Employee Visits and the Imposition of State Use Taxes on Out-of-State Sellers, in 1999
Institute on State and Local Tax (2000) (with Gall and Van Tifflin).
The Evolution of the Electric Utility Industry, 16 State Tax Notes 581 (1999).
Marvin Chirelstein: A Tribute, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 27 (1996).
The Disclosure of State Corporate Tax Data, NTA Forum (Summer, 1993).
Comment on Interstate Tax Competition After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 12 Journal of
Policy Analysis and Manag. 149 (1993).
Book Review, Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China, 39 Can. Tax Rev. 1654
(1992).
Don't Count on Tax Cuts to Spur the Economy and Create Jobs, Hartford Courant,
August 9, 1991.
Regionalization of Services and Taxes Needed for Central Cities, 19 Connecticut Town
and Country 12 (1991).
The Like-Kind Exchange of Real Estate, in TAX PRACTICE SERIES (1989).
Book Review, McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules of the United States, 43 Tax
Notes 1543 (1989).
Connecticut's Faulty Tax Debate, Hartford Courant, September 17, 1989.
The Tax Treatment of Involuntary Conversions, in TAX PRACTICE SERIES (1989).
Foreword, Symposium Issue on State Tax Reform, 51 Alb. L. Rev. 369 (1987).
Night of the Murdered Poets, Hartford Courant, August 14, 1987 (with N. Lande).
The Call to "Give the Windfall Back"-To Which Taxpayers?, Hartford Courant, March 17,
1987; reprinted as Tax Reform: Is Connecticut Business Going to Pay More than
its Fair Share?, New Haven Register, April 19, 1987; and as The 1986 Tax
Reform Act: Windfall or Reparations to the State?, The Connecticut Law Tribune,
April 20, 1987.
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China's New Foreign Tax Law: A Major Step, Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1981
(with T. Gelatt), reprinted as Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law Adopted, 4 East
Asian Executive Reports 3 (1982).
Do Chinese Income Taxes Qualify for the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit?, 3 East Asian
Executive Reports 8 (1981) (with T. Gelatt).
The Victims of Property Tax Reform, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980.
Can Tax Policy be Used to Stimulate Economic Development?, remarks prepared for the
American University--Multistate Tax Commission's State and Local Business Tax
Symposium, 29 Am. U.L. Rev. 207 (1980).
China's Taxes for Foreign Venturers, The Financial Times, June 11, 1980 (with O.
Oldman).
Mortgage Plan Inefficient, Costly, Toronto Star, May 28, 1979; reprinted as Mortgage
Deductibility Plan Has Pitfalls, Ottawa Journal, May 29, 1979.
Tax Exempt Property and Tax Capitalization in Central Cities: A Comment, Proceedings
6th Annual Conference, New England Business and Economic Association 53
(Koveos ed. 1979).
A Fairer Tax Share, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1978, reprinted in PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
FOR NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS 28 (1978).
Testimony Before the Finance Committee's Subcommittee on Tax Exempt Property,
reprinted in PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS:
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS (1978).
Remarks Prepared for the Connecticut School Finance Seminar, in WHAT ARE
CONNECTICUT'S CHOICES UNDER HORTON V. MESKILL 19 (1978).
Discussion Draft Prepared for the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce's Task Force
on Tax Exempt Property, in PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR NON-PROFIT
INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS 10 (1978).
The United States Interest Equalization Tax, 28 Bull. for Int'l Fiscal Doc. 3 (1974).
Comparative Analysis of Depreciation in the Common Market: United Kingdom, 12 Eur.
Tax 190 (1972).
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MINOR REVIEWS
Book Review, 38 State Tax Notes 555 (2005) (reviewing Arthur Rosen and Susan
Hattfield, Sales and Use Taxes: Streamlined Sales Tax System).
Book Review, 31 State Tax Notes 67 (2004) (reviewing David Brunori, Local Tax Policy,
A Federalist Perspective).
Book Review, 21 State Tax Notes 771 (2001) (reviewing David Brunori, State Tax
Policy: A Political Perspective).
Book Review, 13 Tax Notes International 1229 (1996) (reviewing McIntyre & Arnold,
International Tax Primer).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 261 (1993) (reviewing U.S. General Accounting Office,
Balanced Budget Requirements: State Experiences and Implications for the
Federal Government (1993)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 262 (1993) (reviewing F. Stocker ed., A Look at State
and Local Tax Policies: Past Trends and Future Prospects (1991)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 263 (1993) (reviewing R. Broadway & A. Hobson,
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Canada (1993)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 264 (1993) (reviewing W. Duncombe, Economic
Change and the Evolving State Tax Structure: The Case of the Sales Tax (1992)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 264 (1993) (reviewing W. Fox, Sales Taxation: Critical
Issues in Policy and Administration (1992)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 264 (1993) (reviewing J. & W. Hellerstein, State
Taxation, Vol. 1: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes (1993)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 265 (1993) (reviewing City of New York, New York
City Annual Report on Tax Expenditures (1992)).
Book Review, 5 State Tax Notes 265 (1993) (reviewing T. Pogue, State Taxation of
Business: Issues and Policy Options (1992)).
Book Review, 4 State Tax Notes 347 (1993) (reviewing Proposition 13: A Ten- Year
Retrospective (R. Stocker ed., 1991)).
Book Review, 4 State Tax Notes 347 (1993) (reviewing W. Oates, Studies in Fiscal
Federalism (1991)).
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Book Review, 4 State Tax Notes 348 (1993) (reviewing B. Roberts, Competition Across
the Atlantic: The States Face Europe ‘92 (1991)).
Book Review, 4 State Tax Notes 349 (1993) (reviewing Canadian Tax Foundation,
Provincial and Municipal Finances 1991 (1992)).
Book Review, 5 Tax Notes International 894 (1992) (reviewing B. Terra, Introduction to
Value Added Tax in the E.C. After 1992 (1992)).
Book Review, 5 Tax Notes International 1043 (1992) (reviewing M. McIntyre, The
International Income Tax Rules of the United States (2d ed. 1992)).
Book Review, 5 Tax Notes International 1043 (1992) (reviewing M. McIntyre,
International Tax Workbook: 1992 (1992)).
Book Review, 5 Tax Notes International 893 (1992) (reviewing World Bank, Lessons of
Tax Reform (1991)).
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